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! Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the impact of inventory manager’ trust on their replenishment 
decision. We conduct this study in the experimental environment and design an 
experiment with unknown market demand, local information, and under continuous 
replenishment review. We also develop a multi-round trust measurement procedure 
through questionnaires and administer it in the context of a laboratory experiment. To 
conduct the study, we take the three following steps: First we investigate inventory 
replenishment decision under continuous review in a decentralized supply chain. Our 
results show that order time intervals increase along the supply chain. Inventory 
managers’ replenishment decisions affect their own and the other echelons’ costs. 
Moreover, we find that wholesaler plays the smoothing role in the decentralized 
supply chain. Second, we develop a multi-round trust measurement procedure through 
questionnaires and conduct it in the context of a laboratory experiment. This design 
allows us to observe inventory managers’ trust in customer and trust in supplier over 
time. Our results show that trust exist in a decentralized supply chain, with local 
information, no communication, and no access to the market demand, and trust level 
varies in a continuum of intensity in a decentralized supply chain. Also, we find that 
trust evolves and for some echelons it grows over time. We further examine trust in 
customer and trust in supplier along the supply chain. Our results suggest that trust in 
supplier is the lowest in the middle of supply chain and that trust in customer 
decreases while moving upstream along a decentralized supply chain. Finally, we 
study the impact of trust in inventory replenishment decision and analyze data at 
individual and echelon level. Our results show that low trust in customer is linked to 
high order quantity and long order time intervals at the individual levels. Also, results 
on the echelon level suggest that distributor exhibits the lowest trust, highest order 
quantity and largest order time intervals among echelons, and retailer is the only 
echelon that considers trust in supplier while placing order quantities to upstream 
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supplier. We further explore the inventory holding behavior of managers and find that 
inventory managers hold higher inventory level when they have lower trust in 
customer and trust in their upstream supplier. This research fits within the behavioral 
operations field. 
 
Keywords: Trust, Supply chain relationships, Inventory replenishment decision, 
Continuous review, laboratory experiment, behavioral operations. 
 
  
! vii 
! !
! Résumé 
 
Cette thèse examine l’impact de la confiance entre entreprises partenaires dans une 
chaîne logistique sur le comportement des approvisionneurs, et notamment leurs 
décisions d’achat. L’étude est développée et réalisée dans un cadre expérimental 
représentant une chaîne logistique de quatre échelons s’approvisionnant en continu, 
sans communication entre échelons et avec une demande non divulguée. Nous 
développons dans ce cadre une procédure de mesure de l’évolution du niveau de 
confiance en fonction des transactions effectuées. Pour notre étude, nous avons 
procédé en trois étapes: D’abord nous investiguons la décision d’approvisionnement 
dans une chaîne logistique décentralisée où les fréquences de passage d’ordres sont 
laissées au libre choix du décideur. Nos résultats démontrent que les intervalles de 
temps entre commandes augmentent de l’aval de la chaîne vers l’amont, affectant les 
coûts à chaque échelon. De plus, nous constatons que les maillons du centre de la 
chaîne jouent des rôles de régulateur. En second lieu, nous développons une 
procédure de mesure de la confiance sous forme de questionnaires dans un contexte 
expérimental composé de plusieurs étapes, permettant d’évaluer la confiance du 
gestionnaire aussi bien en son client qu’en son fournisseur. Nos résultats montrent que 
dans une chaîne logistique décentralisée sans communication et sans accès à 
l’information sur la demande du marché, la confiance existe et son degré varie selon 
l’intensité de la relation entre les partenaires. Nous avons trouvé que la confiance peut 
changer et évoluer dans le temps pour certains échelons. De plus, nous avons examiné 
la confiance en le client et la confiance en le fournisseur. Nos résultats démontrent 
que la confiance en le client diminue d’aval vers l’amont de la chaîne. Finalement, 
nous étudions l’impact de la confiance sur les décisions d’approvisionnement et nous 
analysons les données au niveau individuel et au niveau des échelons. Notre résultat 
implique que la diminution de la confiance en un client est liée à la grande taille des 
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commandes passées et aux longs intervalles de temps entre commandes. Au niveau de 
l’échelon, les résultats suggèrent que le distributeur affiche la confiance la plus basse, 
la plus grande taille moyenne de commande et les commandes les plus espacées dans 
le temps, alors que le détaillant est le seul échelon qui prend en considération la 
confiance en son fournisseur quand il place ses commandes. Nous explorons le 
comportement du gestionnaire du stock et concluons qu’il constitue davantage de 
stocks quand sa confiance en son client et sa confiance en son fournisseur sont faibles.  
 
Mots-clés : Confiance, relations dans les chaînes logistiques, décision 
d’approvisionnement de stocks, gestion comportementale, expérimentation.  
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Introduction 
 
he main goal of this chapter is to highlight the motivation and the objective of this 
research. The following issues will be addressed in this chapter; 
1. Thesis motivation and objective 
2. Research questions 
3. Research methods 
4. Research contribution 
5. Thesis structure 
  
T  
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Introduction 
1. Thesis motivation and objective 
Supply chain is “the network of organizations that are involved, through upstream and 
downstream linkages, in the different processes and activities that produce value in 
the form of products and services in the hands of the ultimate consumer” (Christopher, 
2010). A supply chain has a dynamic nature that encompasses people, activities, 
information, and resources.  
 One way to reach this goal is to see the supply chain dynamic with a normative 
lens. By this way, we assume that people, hereafter inventory managers, are fully 
rational, make profit-maximizing decisions, and they are aware of the feedback of 
their decisions. Thus, inventory managers must “mind the gap!” between demand and 
supply and adjust to the prescribed normative models.  
 Various normative models to date have been proposed to assist inventory managers 
in filling the gap between demand and supply. The common behavioral assumptions 
used in normative models are as follows: people are; (1) not the core of operations, 
(2) not predictable, (3) independent, (4) observable, (5) emotionless, (6) stationary 
with no learning, fatigue, and problem solving, and (7) not part of product or service 
(Bourdreau et al., 2003). Nevertheless, the demand-supply mismatch still remains.  
 One might ask while satisfying downstream customer demand and minimizing 
total costs in supply chain, how do the inventory managers’ decisions change over 
time along supply chains? The most obvious answer is that the inventory manager 
who makes decision, the customer who places orders, and the supplier who regulates 
the inventory level are all “human beings” and human decision-making is bounded to 
availability of information and their processes.  
 Research shows that decision makers have a cognitive limitation to formulate 
complex problems, in a finite time on the basis of available information, and fail to 
follow normative models. Furthermore, it appears that decision makers systematically 
deviate from the normative models (Kahneman et al., 1982). Evidence within the 
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supply chain literature also confirms this breakdown (Bolton and Katok, 2005; 
Croson and Donohue, 2006; Sterman, 2006). This fact calls for a new way to look at 
supply chain dynamic and the basic assumptions of operations.  
 As an alternative lens, behavioral operations explore human behavior and 
cognition and the impact on operating systems and processes (Gino and Pisano, 2008). 
By this way, we treat human behavior as the core on operations and consider the 
decision maker at best boundedly rational.  
 Behavioral operations is a multidisciplinary branch of operations management. It 
offers insight to the problems in operations management with elements from all three 
components of behavior, operations, and management. Fundamental theories on 
cognitive psychology, social psychology, and sociology to date enormously offer 
insight to solve the operations problems (Bendoly et al., 2010). Therefore, there is a 
large range of research methods from experiment, survey, to mathematical modeling 
to utilize in behavioral operations research (Croson et al., 2012). 
 This thesis fits within the behavioral operations field and aims to identify whether 
the trust perception of the inventory manager affects her/his inventory replenishment 
decision. Within this context, the objectives of this thesis are three-fold. 
1. To identify the ordering behavior of the inventory manager under continuous 
review in decentralized supply chain. This requires micro analysis of the 
inventory manager decisions on order quantity and order time intervals at 
individual and echelon levels. 
2. To develop a procedure to measure the level of trust between inventory 
managers in different echelons over time. This involves a measurement that 
considers multiple observations of the inventory managers’ trust perception in 
her/his customer and in her/his supplier.  
3. To examine the effect of trust in customer and trust in supplier on the inventory 
manager’s replenishment decision. This requires an appropriate research design 
to draw conclusion on causality between trust and inventory replenishment 
decisions.  
! 4 
2. Research questions 
The following questions correspond to the main goal of this study: 
1. How do inventory replenishment decisions in continuous review systems 
change along the supply chain; more specifically; how do order time intervals 
change along the supply chain?  
2. Do all inventory managers behave similarly in different echelons?  
3. How does the variability of order quantity and order time intervals influence 
costs within the supply chain? 
4. Do inventory managers trust in their supplier or trust in their customer in a 
decentralized supply chain? 
5. How does the level of trust in customer change among echelons?  
6. How does the level of trust in supplier change among echelons? 
7. How does trust (in customer and in supplier) change over time? 
8. Does trust (in customer or in supplier) of the inventory manager affect her/his 
inventory replenishment decisions? If so, how? 
9. Is there a link between the inventory manager’s trust perception (in supplier 
or customer) and her/his inventory holding behavior?  
3. Research methods 
In order to cover research goals and provide suitable answers to the research questions, 
this study is conducted in an experimental environment. The experimental 
environment is selected for two main reasons. First, it is a stable and controlled 
environment. Thus, it allows one to control extraneous variables (Katok, 2011) and 
remove possible behavioral noises such as coalition and power. Second, it provides 
continuous data storage that assures the availability of a reliable database for later 
analysis. 
 We design an experimental setting where there are unknown market demands and 
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local information availability. Communication is not possible, and in fact participants 
interact anonymously and never find out with whom they play. We implement a role-
playing simulation platform developed by Montreuil et al. (2008) to mimic the 
decentralized supply chain. This allows us to untangle order quantity and order time 
intervals and examine their behavior along the supply chain. 
 To measure trust, a multi-round trust measurement procedure through 
questionnaires is administrated in the context of a laboratory experiment. We 
distinguish between trust in supplier and trust in customer and measure inventory 
managers’ trust within a decentralized supply chain. Since the inventory manager’s 
trust perception is measured over time, we examine the trend of trust development for 
each echelon. Moreover, using questionnaires in the context of a laboratory 
experiment provides repeatable and reliable observations for both trust perception and 
inventory replenishment decision. Analysis of the distribution of variables suggests 
that they do not have a normal-like distribution. We use nonparametric statistics to 
analyze data in Chapter 2 and implement Linear Mixed Effect Model (LMM) and 
Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) to assess the research questions of 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
 
4. Thesis contribution 
This research contributes to the extent literature in a number of ways.  
 First, it provides details on the ordering behavior of inventory managers in a 
continuous review system in a triadic supply chain context (Distributor, Wholesaler, 
Retailer) and it shows that (1) order time intervals increase along the supply chain, (2) 
wholesaler plays the smoothing role in the decentralized supply chain, (3) inventory 
managers’ replenishment decisions affect their own and the other echelons’ costs.  
 Second, this research develops a procedure to measure the level of trust among 
supply chain echelons over time. The findings show that (1) trust exist in a 
decentralized supply chain, with local information, no communication, and no access 
to the market demand, (2) trust level varies in a continuum of intensity in a 
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decentralized supply chain, (3) trust evolves and for some echelons it grows over time, 
and (4) trust in supplier is the lowest in the middle of supply chain and that trust in 
customer decreases while moving upstream along a decentralized supply chain.  
 Third, this study shows that inventory managers’ trust perception affects their 
inventory replenishment decision and inventory behavior at the individual and 
echelon levels. The findings show that (1) low trust in customer is linked to high 
order quantity and long order time intervals at the individual levels, (2) distributor 
exhibits the lowest trust, highest order quantity and largest order time intervals among 
echelons, (3) retailer is the only echelon that considers trust in supplier while placing 
order quantities to upstream supplier, (3) inventory managers hold higher inventory 
level when they have lower trust in customer and trust in their upstream supplier. 
Lower level of trust in customer lead inventory managers to hold higher inventory 
levels. These findings propose that trust in customer and trust in supplier under 
demand and supply uncertainties lead inventory managers to hold higher inventory 
levels. 
 
5. Thesis structure 
The thesis is organized as follows; Chapter 2 examines the inventory replenishment 
decision under continuous review system in decentralized supply chain. Chapter 3 
proposes a procedure to measure the level of trust among supply chain echelons and 
evaluates trust in customer and trust in supplier over time in a decentralized supply 
chain. Chapter 4 studies the effect of trust on inventory managers’ replenishment 
decision and their inventory holding behavior. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis, 
highlights the findings, limitations of this research, and provides recommendation for 
future research.  
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Chapter 2 !
 
Inventory Replenishment Decisions Under Continuous Review 
System 
 
he main goal of this research is to identify the ordering behavior of the inventory 
manager in a continuous review system within a decentralized supply chain. The 
following questions will be addressed in this chapter; 
1. How do order time intervals change along the supply chain?  
2. Do all inventory managers behave similarly in different echelons?  
3. How does the variability of order quantity and order time intervals influences 
the costs within the supply chain? 
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Inventory Replenishment Decisions Under Continuous Review System 
 
Abstract 
Inventory managers mostly do not follow normative optimization models. At best 
they introduce a level of bounded rationality instead of full rationality in their 
inventory replenishment decisions. In this paper, we examine the behavior of 
inventory managers in a continuous review system within a decentralized supply 
chain. We implement an experimental approach with unknown market demand and 
local information availability. The analysis reveals that not only the magnitude and 
the variability of order quantity tend to be larger, but also the order time intervals is 
lengthen and highly variable while moving upstream along the supply chain. We also 
investigate how the inventory managers’ replenishment decisions influence echelons 
holding, backorder, and total costs. Results show that the large order quantities and 
long order time intervals induced by the inventory managers increase their holding 
and backorder costs in the upstream supply chain. Results also suggest that reduction 
in the variability of customer order quantity significantly decreases the upstream 
supplier total cost. 
 
Keywords: Behavioral operations management, Continuous Inventory replenishment, 
Supply chain, Laboratory experiment. 
 
1. Introduction 
Consider a decentralized supply chain in which products move through multiple serial 
echelons before they are finally shipped to the end customer. In such a serial multi-
echelon inventory system, inventory managers make inventory replenishment 
decisions based on local information (Lee and Billington, 1993) to regulate the 
inventory levels, minimize costs, and satisfy downstream customer demand. The 
inventory replenishment decision is in response to two fundamental questions: how 
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much to order (order quantity) and when to order (order time)? 
 The frequency of inventory replenishment decisions is determined by the inventory 
review process, which can be classified in periodic review systems and continuous 
review systems. In a periodic review system, inventory is monitored periodically and 
the inventory replenishment decision is made at a fixed time interval, whereas in a 
continuous review system, inventory is checked continuously and the order time 
interval is variable. This fact denotes that in a continuous review system both order 
quantity and order time intervals are variable. 
 Numerous periodic and continuous inventory review models have been proposed 
to optimize echelon’s cost and profit and consequently to improve supply chain 
performance (Aviv, 2003; Clark and Scarf, 1960; De Bodt and Graves, 1985; 
Federgruen and Zipkin, 1984). However, the actual behavior shows that decision 
maker’s mind has a restricted capacity to formulate complex problems in a finite time, 
on the basis of available information (Loch and Wu, 2007; Gino and Pisano, 2008; 
Simon, 1969).  
 There is considerable empirical and experimental evidence indicating that the 
actual behavior of an inventory manager tends to deviate from the optimal decisions 
proposed by the extant literature on operations management (Bolton and Katok, 2005; 
Croson and Donohue, 2006; Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Sterman, 2000). One of 
well-acknowledged operations management problem is the mismatch arising between 
demand and supply processes. To match demand and supply, inventory managers 
place orders and regulate inventory levels to avoid backlog. Yet, their efforts are not 
always successful and most often result in the demand–supply mismatch. The 
demand-supply mismatch could further exacerbate order quantity and/or order 
frequency amplification along the chain. In spite of the vast amount of literature on 
order quantity oscillation and amplification, there is scarce evidence of the order time 
interval variation along the supply chain. Given that, interesting questions arise, 
namely, (i) How do order time intervals change along the supply chain? (ii) Do all 
inventory managers behave similarly in different echelons? (iii) How does the 
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variability of order quantity and order time intervals influence costs within the supply 
chain? 
 The main goal of this research is to understand the ordering behavior of an 
inventory manager in a continuous review system within a decentralized supply chain. 
Toward this end, the experiment designed in this work shows that not only does the 
magnitude and variability of order quantity increase, but also the order time intervals 
lengthen and their variability increases along the supply chain from retailer and 
wholesaler to distributor.  
 The next section provides the literature related to the work. Section 3 describes the 
problem. Section 4 details the proposed method. Section 5 deals with the statistical 
analyses and results. Section 6 discusses the results and highlights the findings. 
Finally, section 7 concludes the paper, presents the limitations, and proposes the 
future research directions. All experimental materials are provided in appendixes. 
 
2. Literature review 
From pivotal studies of 1960s to the recent studies, researchers have long recognized 
the importance of order amplification in supply chains. The literature in inventory 
replenishment can be divided into two streams: Normative and behavioral. In the 
former literature stream, researchers model inventory replenishment and prescribe 
optimized policies while in the latter literature stream, researchers assess inventory 
replenishment decisions and in different experimental settings describe the causes of 
its amplification along the supply chain. The following subsections review the most 
relevant body of the literature to our work.  
 
2.1. Normative literature stream on inventory replenishment 
  Simon (1952) utilizes control theory to analyze simple production-inventory 
systems. In his work, he highlights pure delays in production-inventory systems that 
are hard to deal with. To approximate pure delays, he uses exponential delays by 
smoothing the output signal over time. Vassian (1955) extends Simon’s continuous-
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time theory to discrete time models. In one of the early operations research models 
addressing multi-echelon inventory, Clark and Scarf (1960) propose optimal policies 
for a multi-echelon inventory problem under periodic review, when the demand is 
unknown and uncertain. 
 Schmidt and Nahmias (1985) extend the Clark-Scarf approach by characterizing 
the optimal inventory policy for a simple assembly system. Federgruen and Zipkin 
(1984) also extend the Clark-Scarf approach from the finite horizon to the infinite 
horizon. De Bodt and Graves (1985) extend the Clark-Scarf approach from periodic 
review to continuous review. Badinelli (1992) constructs a model for continuous-
review policies in multi-echelon supply chain. Grubbström and Wikner (1996) study 
inventory replenishment systems with the aid of control theory. They show that 
inventory trigger control policies can be mathematically described by differential 
equations involving Heaviside and Dirac impulse functions. Chen (1999) considers 
information delays in decentralized supply chains. He also verifies the optimality of 
implementing a base stock policy under a centralized team.  
 There is no doubt of the importance of models in inventory management as well as 
their contribution to finding optimal inventory replenishment decision indicators and 
improving the performance of supply chain. However, these normative models 
assume that people are fully rational, make profit-maximizing decisions, and they are 
aware of the feedback of their decisions. The actual human behavior shows significant 
deviations from optimal policies and prescriptive models (Bendoly at al., 2006; 
Bendoly et al., 2010; Gino and Pisano, 2008). 
 
2.2. Behavioral literature stream on inventory replenishment 
 Forrester (1961) introduces a nonlinear model of supply chain using exponential 
delays. He designs a role-playing supply chain simulation game called ‘Beer 
distribution game’ and shows demand amplification in upstream supply chain. He 
underlines that structure, policies, and decision makers’ interactions in supply chain 
are the main reasons for order amplification. Towill (1991) and Wikner et al. (1991) 
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extend Forrester’s work to two-echelon and three-echelon supply chain contexts and 
conclude that the lack of coordination in supply chain leads to variability in order 
quantity across the supply chain. In an analytical study, Lee et al. (1997) highlight 
four structural reasons for order quantity amplification: demand signal processing, 
order batching, price variation, and inventory rationing.  
 Sterman (1989) presents a generic model of stock management. He proposes an 
ordering decision model based on locally rational heuristics in decentralized supply 
chain. In fact, by characterizing decision maker mental processes, he bases the 
decision process on an anchor and adjustment policy and identifies underweighting 
the supply line (units of product ordered but not yet received) as the cause of order 
quantity amplification. Dogan and Sterman (2005, 2006) study phantom ordering in 
order quantity decision-making processes. Phantom orders arise in supply chains 
when an upstream supplier is unable to fulfill orders on-time. Thus, the customer 
responds to backlogs by placing larger order quantities. In a similar work, Oliva and 
Gonçalves (2007) study overreaction in order quantity decision-making processes. As 
in previous studies, they find that decision makers ignore the supply line and in case 
of shortage, they saturate order quantity adjustment at a maximum value instead of 
overreacting. 
 In experimental studies, researchers show that shorter ordering and shipment lead-
times improve decentralized supply chain performance under periodic review 
(Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi, 1998; Kimbrough et al., 2002; Steckel et al., 2004). 
Also, sharing point of sale information (Croson and Donohue, 2003; Gupta et al., 
2001; Steckel et al., 2004), using electronic data interchange (Machuca and Barajas, 
2004), and communication (Wu and Katok, 2006) can significantly improve 
decentralized supply chain performance under periodic review. Croson and Donohue 
(2006) show that order quantity amplification remains even when the market demand 
is known and when all four structural causes of order quantity amplification are 
removed. Rong et al. (2008) consider the reactions to supply and demand uncertainty 
and introduce reverse order quantity amplification. Croson et al. (2012) investigate 
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the role of coordination stock on supply chain stability and show that uncertainty of 
individual decisions is one of the behavioral causes of order quantity amplification.  
 In spite of the vast amount of literature on order quantity amplification, there is 
scarce evidence of the order time behavior. Given the evidence about the order 
quantity amplification along the supply chain, an interesting question arises, namely, 
how do order time intervals change along the supply chain? In order to answer this 
question, we design and run experiments in a decentralized linear supply chain under 
continuous inventory replenishment. 
 
3. Problem description 
Let i be the echelon index (i = [R, W, D]; R: retailer, W: wholesaler, D: distributor) in 
a supply chain and i = M for the market index. Each inventory manager fulfills the 
orders received from the downstream customer if sufficient on-hand inventory is 
available, otherwise he accumulates backlogs. S/he decides on how much and when to 
order with the upstream supplier and places an order !"!" at time j  [0, T], where T 
is the length of the relationship. We define order time intervals at the echelon i as the 
time durations between two consecutive placed orders denoted by! "!". 
 Market demand is unknown and customer orders are transferred in the form of 
information flows from market to factory, trigging material flows from upstream to 
downstream. Both information and material flows are subject to delays: Order lead-
time (!! = 1!!"#), and shipment lead-time (!! ≥ 2!!"#$). Note that the shipment lead-
time is potentially variable and depends on the availability of on-hand inventory at the 
upstream supplier. This represents the time required to receive and to ship orders, 
which is not less than 2 days. Therefore, on-hand inventory must be regulated with 
respect to the shipment delays.  
 Inventory managers make inventory replenishment decisions with local 
information. Local information for inventory manager of echelon i at time j includes 
the received orders from downstream customer the on-hand inventory, the placed 
orders to the upstream supplier, the shipments of upstream supplier, and the 
∈
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shipments to downstream customer. Moreover, inventory manager of echelon i does 
not know the orders from the downstream customer that are currently being processed, 
on-hand inventory level of her/his upstream supplier, and the time at which s/he 
receives the upstream supplier shipments. The inventory manager’s goal is to 
maximize his profit. The profit that a manager earns at the echelon ! is; !"#$%&! = !"#$%&! − !"#$#!         (1) !"#$%&! = !!"#$%! + !"##$%&'!!"#$%&'(&!!"#$!       (2) !"#$%! = !! . !!!!! !"           (3) 
where !!is the price per unit at the echelon i and !!"! is shipment of i at j. !"##$%&'!!"#$%&'(&!!"#$! = !!!!!. !!!!!! (!!!)! !                 (4) 
where !!!! is the backorder cost per unit per day and !!(!!!)! !is the outstanding 
order or the unfilled order of (i+1)th echelon at time j. Also, the cost components that 
the inventory manager incurs in the echelon ! are !"#$#! = !"#$%&'(&!!"#$! + ℎ!"#$%&!!"#$! + !"#$ℎ!"#$%!!"#$!               (5) 
Backorder cost (!") is the cost that the subjects incur for unfilled orders, that is !"! = !! !. !!!!!! !"                        (6) 
where !! is the backorder cost per unit per day and !!!" !is the outstanding order or 
the unfilled order of ith echelon at time j.  
 Holding cost (!") is the cost that the inventory manager incurs for holding 
inventory, that is  !"! = !ℎ! . !"!!!! !"            (7) 
where ℎ! is the holding cost per unit per day and !"!" is the on-hand inventory of the 
echelon i  at time j.  
 Purchasing cost, the cost that the inventory managers incur for placing orders to 
their upstream supplier, has fixed and variable components. Purchasing cost is !"! = (!!!!! ! + !! .!"!")          (8) 
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where ! is the fixed order cost, !! is the price per unit for the echelon i, and !"!" is 
the order quantity of the echelon i at time j. The price per unit, !! depends on the 
echelon. It increases from the upstream supplier to the downstream customer, due to 
the added value to the finished product across the chain. There is no transportation 
cost.  
 Under a continuous review system, each inventory manager makes a decision 
on how much to order and when to order with local information. Inventory managers 
must keep enough inventory to fulfill their customer needs and to avoid backlogs. To 
hold enough on-hand inventory, orders must be placed at the right quantity and at the 
right time. Nevertheless, customer on-hand inventory depends on the supplier 
shipments and on-hand inventory at the upstream suppliers. Variable time lags and 
impacts of previous decisions on the future ones add complexity to the continuous 
replenishment decision. 
 
4. Method 
Continuous replenishment decision-making has a dynamic and complex nature. This 
decision includes order quantity and order time, and is characterized by time lags and 
impacts of previous decisions on future ones. A laboratory experiment is a suitable 
research tool to uncover the dynamic and complex nature of continuous replenishment 
decisions and address decision makers’ cognitive limitations (Chatfield et al., 2004; 
Croson and Donohue, 2002). A laboratory experiment provides a stable and 
controlled environment, which eliminates possible noises and external perturbations 
(Katok, 2011). Moreover, it provides the opportunity to observe a decision maker’s 
behavior over time and ensures multiple, repeatable, and reliable observations. To run 
the laboratory experiment, an appropriate platform is needed. 
 
4.1. Experimental platform 
We implement a role-playing platform developed by Montreuil et al. (2008). In this 
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platform, continuous inventory replenishment is considered, which means that both 
order quantity and order time are variable. This is the major difference with respect to 
the well-known beer distribution game in which variable order quantities are placed 
within a fixed time interval between orders. 
 The platform mimics the inventory replenishment dynamics in a decentralized 
linear supply chain. The platform consists of four echelons representing the roles of 
retailer, wholesaler, distributor, and factory. Market does not fill orders and demands 
from the retailer. The retailer delivers the requested item orders out of his on-hand 
inventory and, if necessary, he orders the same items from the wholesaler. Likewise, 
the wholesaler delivers the requested items out of his on-hand inventory, orders items, 
and receives the items from the distributor, who in turn orders and receives items 
from the factory. The factory produces the items. There is no inventory capacity 
limitation. Figure 1 shows the structure supply chain in the experiment. Dotted lines 
indicate orders and solid lines indicate shipments. Filled rectangles represent echelons 
with human participants while empty rectangles represent echelons with computer 
agents. Human participants, thereafter subjects, play the roles of the retailer, 
wholesaler and distributor, and computer agents play the factory and the market roles. 
None of the subjects are aware of the fact that factory role is simulated by a computer.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the supply chain used in the experiment 
 
The market demand is stable. It follows a normal distribution with a mean of 3000 
units/day, and a standard deviation of 500 units/day, truncated at zero. This daily 
demand is randomly split in two orders per day. The demand information is unknown 
to the subjects. 
 
4.2. Experimental procedure 
Market Retailer Distributor Factory Wholesaler 
Demand  
N (3000, 500) 
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The experiment proceeds as follows; a subject enters the laboratory at an appointed 
time and is randomly assigned to a team and a role. Before starting the experiment, 
we provide a 4-5 page handout explaining the instructions of the experiment and a 
summary of the role information to each subject. After that the subjects read the 
instructions of the experiment, their questions are answered, and the experiment 
interface is then presented.  
 Subjects are asked to play the simulation for 30 days (20 minutes) as a warm-up 
exercise to become familiar with the interface. After the warm-up session, we 
examine the subjects understanding of the experiment and their decision task in a 
short quiz to assure they acquired a sufficient knowledge. To avoid an end of the 
experiment behavior, the duration of the simulation is not announced in advance. The 
experiment lasts for 120 days (55 minutes) followed by a debriefing session. After the 
debriefing session, the subjects are asked to fill in a post-experiment questionnaire to 
reflect on their replenishment policies during the experiment. The subjects are paid 
based on their performance during the experiment as follows. 
Earning = Min {50, Show-up fee (10 CHF) + 40 CHF * ( !"#$!!"#$%&!"#$%&#!!"!!!!!!"#$!!"#$%&)} (9) 
 The subjects could earn 10 CHF for showing up to the experiment. In addition 
to this amount, they could earn up to 50 CHF, on the basis of their profit with respect 
to the role average profit. The maximum earning is approximately equivalent to two-
hour wages for a student job. 
 
4.3. Experimental settings 
To examine the dynamics of inventory replenishment in a decentralized supply chain, 
the information availability is set as local (Lee and Billington, 1993). Thus, subjects 
are not allowed to communicate with anyone during the experiments and have 
visibility only of their own echelon dynamics. A given subject has access to the 
following local information; the received order quantity and order time from 
downstream customer, their own on-hand inventory, the placed order quantity and 
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order time with the upstream supplier, incoming shipments of the upstream supplier, 
out bound shipments to the downstream customer, and their performance measures 
(i.e. cost and profit levels, supplier and customer service levels!). The holding cost is 
set at 0.75$/unit/day and the backorder cost at 1.5$/unit/day for all echelons (see 
appendix A for more detail). 
 
4.4. Subjects 
48 undergraduate and graduate students from two Swiss universities, EPFL and UNIL, 
with engineering and business majors, participated in this experiment, for payoff 
contingent on their performance. The subjects consisted of 39% women and 61% men, 
with 24% of undergraduate, 54% master, and 22% PhD students. The experiment was 
conducted in the spring semester of 2011.  
 
5. Statistical analyses and results 
The data set consists of 16 supply chain teams. The exploratory graphs propose the 
elimination of four supply chains from the data sample, as the related subjects did not 
make properly use of the experimental platform. Therefore, we report on the results of 
12 supply chains. Statistical analysis is carried out using the SPSS version 21. Results 
of the experiment are analyzed on two levels; the individual and the echelon levels. 
The individual level analysis refers to the obtained data for each subject, while the 
echelon level analysis refers to the aggregation of individual results for a considered 
role.   
5.1. Inventory replenishment 
5.1.1 Mean replenishment decision indicators 
Table 1 summarizes the mean of order quantity and order time intervals for all 
individuals and echelons. Results reveal that for 100% of the teams, the replenishment 
decision indicators increase while moving from retailer to wholesaler. However, only 
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58% of the distributors increase their replenishment decision indicators compared to 
wholesalers. Thus, the analysis of the results in Table 1 leads us to two main 
observations. 
Table 1. Mean order quantity (OQ) and order time intervals (OT) for each individual and 
echelon 
Team D  W  R M OQ OT OQ OT OQ OT OQ OT 
1 7348 61 3137 25 1022 8 1508 12 
2 7875 56 6911 48 5433 43 1508 12 
3 4890 40 7140 59 1872 15 1508 12 
4 3529 29 3802 31 3381 27 1508 12 
5 7039 58 2813 22 1798 15 1508 12 
6 9711 77 4751 38 3781 30 1508 12 
7 5786 47 7957 65 5530 45 1508 12 
8 6566 56 5839 48 5304 43 1508 12 
9 3733 31 6992 57 2627 21 1508 12 
10 1000 8 4000 31 3512 27 1508 12 
11 3415 28 2645 21 1003 8 1508 12 
12 9634 73 3236 24 1000 8 1508 12 
Mean of each echelon 5877 47 4935 39 3022 24 1508 12 
 
Observation 1: The mean order quantity and mean order time intervals tend to 
increase while moving upstream along the supply chain under continuous review. 
Fig 2 displays the minimum, the maximum, and the mean of the replenishment 
decision indicators for each role over the game. The mean of order quantity and order 
time intervals are (1508, 12), (3022, 24), (4935, 39), (5877, 47) for market (M), 
retailer (R), wholesaler (W) and distributor (D) respectively. The Wilcoxon test 
generates a z-statistic (z) and associates significance level (p) based on the rank-order 
of the data in the two samples (sample size; n = m = 12), which are pairs of (OQR, 
OQW), (OQW, OQD), (OTR, OTW), and (OTW, OTD). Results show that for 100% of the 
cases mean order quantity and mean order time intervals increase while moving from 
retailer to wholesaler (z = -3.062, p < 0.002). Though, 58% of distributors increase 
their replenishment decision indicators compared with wholesalers, the result of the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test does not support this hypothesis for distributors (z = -0.941, 
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p < 0.347). However, a review of the post-experiment questionnaire indicates that 
most of upstream suppliers tend to place larger quantities in longer time intervals. 
  
           (a) Order quantity (in items)                         (b) Order time intervals (in hours) 
Fig 2. (a) Order quantity and (b) order time intervals for each echelon  
Observation 2: Retailer and wholesaler replenishment decision indicators are 
positively correlated, whereas distributor replenishment indicators have no 
significant correlation with its immediate customer. 
Table 2 shows the Spearman rank correlation (Spearman, 1904) among the 
replenishment decision indicators of each echelon. Spearman rank correlation is a 
nonparametric correlation. Because the current datasets are not normally distributed, 
using nonparametric test is of particular importance in data analysis.  
  
Table 2. Spearman rank correlation coefficient matrix among replenishment decision 
indicators of each echelon, ***, and ** significant at p < 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. (N 
=12) 
  OQD OQW OQR OTD OTW OTR 
OQD 1      
OQW 0 1     
OQR 0.035 0.699** 1    
OTD 0.970*** -0.095 -0.079 1   
OTW -0.018 0.989*** 0.709** -0.095 1  
OTR 0.057 0.676** 0.988*** -0.046 0.679** 1 
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Results reveal a strong positive correlation between mean order quantity and 
mean order time interval for each echelon. Moreover, results show that wholesaler’s 
replenishment decision indicators are positively correlated with the immediate 
customer, whereas distributor’s replenishment decision indicators are not.  
5.1.2. Variability of replenishment decision indicators 
The coefficient of variation (CV) is used to study the variability of the replenishment 
decision indicators. The coefficient of variation is a relative variation measure and is a 
way to interpret the relative magnitude of the standard deviation by dividing it by the 
mean. Table 3 provides an overview of the replenishment decision indicators 
variability. We classify the variability into low, medium, and high categories based on 
the following conditions:  
• Low variability: 0 ≤ !"!" < 0.5 and 0 ≤ !"!" < 0.5, 
• Medium variability: 0.5 ≤ !"!" < 1, and/or 0.5 ≤ !"!" < 1, 
• High variability: !"!" ≥ 1, and/or !"!" ≥ 1. 
The analysis of the results presented in table 3 shows that: 
• 6% of the subjects (2 out of 36) have low variability for both order quantity 
and order time intervals, 
• 53% of the subjects (19 out of 36) have medium variability for at least one of 
the two replenishment indicators, 
• 41% of the subjects (15 out of 36) have high variability for at least one of the 
two replenishment indicators. 
Furthermore, among all the subjects, one retailer (R12), one wholesaler (W10), 
and one distributor (D10) have fixed order quantity (!"!" = 0) and variable order time 
intervals policy. All the other subjects (91.5%) follow a variable order quantity and 
variable order time intervals policy. Thus, the analysis of the results in Table 3 leads 
us to the following two main observations. 
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Table 3. Variability on order quantity and order time intervals for each individual  
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Observation 3: The relative number of subjects with high variability of their 
replenishment decision indicators tends to increase while moving upstream from 
market along the supply chain under continuous review 
Table 4 summarizes the numbers of individuals for each variability level. Results for 
the low variability condition,!0 ≤ !"!" < 0.5 and 0 ≤ !"!" < 0.5, show that only 17% 
wholesalers place orders with low variability, where no retailer or distributor belongs 
to that variability range.  
Table 4. The number of individuals on low, medium, high variability conditions 
Variability level Condition  D W R 
Team # 
with this 
condition 
Team # with 2 
echelons following 
this condition  
Low  0 ≤ !"!" < 0.5 0 ≤ !"!" < 0.5 0 17% 0 - - 
Medium 0.5 ≤ !"!" < 1 0.5 ≤ !"!" < 1 25% 33% 67% 4, 5 12 
High !"!" ≥ 1 !"!" ≥ 1 75% 50% 33% - 6, 11, 12 
 
Results of the medium variability condition, !0.5 ≤ !"!"!or!!"!" < 1 , show that the 
tendency of the subjects with the medium variability decreases from retailers (67%), 
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wholesalers (33%), to distributors (25%). For the high variability, results reveal that 
the variability of the replenishment decision indicators tends to be higher on the 
upstream echelons. Therefore, subjects in upstream echelons place more variable 
order quantities at more variable time intervals. 
Table 4 reports that there is no team with low variability condition.  There are 
only 2 teams out of 12, with all three players, showing medium variability of their 
replenishment decision indicators. Table 4 also shows that there is at least one subject 
in a team, dominantly among the upstream echelons, who introduces the medium or 
high variability on her/his inventory replenishment decision. 
 
Observation 4: The variability of replenishment decision indicators for each echelon 
tends to increase while moving upstream from market along the supply chain under 
continuous review. 
Figure 3 illustrates the variability of the replenishment decision indicators for each 
echelon. The aggregated results at the echelon level show that retailers place orders 
with higher variability of the order quantity and order time interval than the market 
demand (CVOQR = 0.43, CVOTR = 0.89). Wholesaler receives these fluctuating orders 
from retailer and increases the variability of order quantity, while the variability of 
order time intervals stays almost unchanged (CVOQW = 0.62, CVOTW = 0.88). Finally, 
results show that distributor increases the variability of both order quantity and order 
time (CVOQD = 0.69, CVOTD = 1.27). Thus, there is an increase of the variability of 
order quantity and order time interval while moving upstream from market along the 
supply chain.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Variability of order quantity and order time intervals at the echelon level   
Retailer Distributor Factory Market Wholesaler 
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5.2. Costs 
Table 5 shows the mean of backorder cost (BC), holding cost (HC), and total cost 
(TTC) for each echelon. The cost components that a subject incurred over the 
experiment in the participatory simulation platform consists of backorder cost, 
holding cost, and purchasing cost. Owing the fact that purchasing cost is highly 
correlated with order quantity and order time intervals of each player, we exclude it 
from our analysis and mainly focused on backorder and holding cost. Thus, the total 
cost is their sum.  
  
Table 5. Mean of backorder (BC), holding cost (HC), and total cost (TTC) 
  BC HC TTC 
Retailer 503,991 217,019 721,009 
Wholesaler 497,937 486,766 984,703 
Distributor 574,494 687,763 1,262,197 
 
Note that the unit cost components are similar across the echelons (see 
appendix A). Results show that the total costs (TTC) increase from retailer to 
distributor. The holding cost (HC) column shows an increase from retailer to 
distributor and the backorder cost (BC) column shows wholesaler incurs less 
backorder cost compared to retailer and distributor. To investigate the relationship 
between the replenishment decision indicators with incurred costs, we perform 
Spearman rank correlation. Table 6 displays the link between replenishment decision 
indicators, backorder cost and holding cost.  
Results show that the backorder cost of distributor is positively correlated with 
its order quantity. Her/his holding cost is also positively correlated with the order 
quantity as well as the order time intervals. Moreover, the same positive correlation is 
observed between wholesaler’s backorder cost and both distributor’s order quantity 
and order time intervals. No significant correlation is identified for any of the 
retailer’s cost, nor for the wholesaler’s holding cost. 
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Table 6. Spearman rank correlation coefficient between replenishment decision indicators, 
holding and backorder costs, ***, and ** significant at p < 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. (N 
=12) 
  BcD HcD BcW HcW BcR HcR 
OQD 0.538** 0.587*** 0.706*** 0.182 0.357 0.531 
OQW 0.133 0.308 0.154 441 -0.336 0.175 
OQR 0.028 0.091 0.339 0.385 -0.168 0.147 
OTD 0.417 0.644*** 0.623*** 0.053 0.406 0.41 
OTW 0.112 0.295 0.088 0.442 -0.372 0.123 
OTR 0.007 0.117 0.411 0.315 -0.159 0.209 
 
Table 7 reports the correlation between replenishment decision indicators and 
total costs (TTC) of each echelon. Results show a strong positive correlation between 
distributor total cost and distributor’s order quantity, order time intervals. Similarly, 
the retailer total cost is positively correlated with the distributor’s order quantity and 
order time interval. Total cost of wholesaler is also positively correlated with 
wholesaler’s order quantity, but no significant correlation is found with the 
wholesaler’s order time intervals. 
Table 7. Spearman rank correlation coefficient correlation between replenishment decision 
indicators and total costs, ***, and ** significant at p < 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. (N =12) 
  TTCD TTCW TTCR 
OQD 0.727*** 0.608** 0.580** 
OQW 0.364 0.336 -0.301 
OQR 0.168 0.357 -0.105 
OTD 0.658** 0.49 0.592** 
OTW 0.34 0.27 -0.358 
OTR 0.156 0.336 -0.071 
 
Table 8 demonstrates the Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the 
variability of the replenishment decision indicators and holding and backorder costs. 
Results show that the distributor backorder cost is positively correlated with the 
variability of the distributor’s order quantity, wholesaler’s order quantity, and order 
time intervals. The distributor holding cost appears to be significantly positively 
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correlated with variability of the distributor’s order quantity. No significant 
correlation is found for wholesaler backorder cost, retailer’s backorder, and holding 
costs.  
 
Table 8. Spearman rank correlation coefficient correlation between replenishment decision 
indicators and total costs, ***, and ** significant at p < 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. (N =12) 
!! BcD HcD BcW HcW BcR HcR 
CVOQD 0.601** 0.678** 0.315 0.469 -0.196 0.343 
CVOQW 0.860*** 0.483 0.371 0.503* 0.014 0.476 
CVOQR 0.091 -0.021 0.413 0.636** 0.224 -0.021 
CVOTD 0.196 0.406 0.497 0.315 0.175 0.021 
CVOTW 0.613** 0.165 0.305 0.2 0.242 0.406 
CVOTR 0.329 -0.333 0.098 0.238 -0.137 0.378 
  
Table 9 depicts the Spearman correlation among variability of the 
replenishment decision indicators and the total cost for each echelon. Results show a 
strong correlation between the distributor’s total cost and the wholesaler’s and 
distributor’s its variability of order quantity. Moreover, results reveal a positive 
correlation between wholesaler’s and retailer’s variability of order quantity and their 
supplier total costs (i.e. distributor and Wholesaler respectively). No significant 
correlation is observed between the variability of order time intervals and the total 
cost of any echelon. 
 
Table 9. Spearman rank correlation coefficient correlation between the variability of 
replenishment decision indicators and total costs, ***, and ** significant at p < 0.01 and 0.05 
levels, respectively. (N =12) 
  TTCD TTCW TTCR 
CVOQD 0.846*** 0.28 -0.201 
CVOQW 0.867*** 0.427 0.193 
CVOQR 0.119 0.580** 0.217 
CVOTD 0.371 0.545 0.147 
CVOTW 0.452 0.375 0.392 
CVOTR 0.063 0.494 -0.032 
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6. Discussion 
Prior explanations for the order quantity amplification in decentralized supply chains 
revolve around decisions on order quantity. The experiment design and tool allow us 
to shed light on the both order quantity and order time intervals. Our results for both 
the individual and echelon levels show that order quantity tends to be larger and order 
time intervals tend to be lengthened while moving upstream along the supply chain 
from the market. The main question to answer is: What are the reasons for this 
amplification?  
 Order amplification is caused by both structural and behavioral reasons. 
Demand signal processing, order batching, price variation, and inventory rationing are 
structured characteristics that cause demand amplification (Lee et al., 1997). Decision 
maker bounded rationality to account for time lags and previous decisions feedbacks 
(Sterman, 1989), and uncertainty of individual decisions for the other supply chain 
members (Croson et al., 2012) are behavioral characteristics that amplify order. In this 
study, unknown market demand leads the subjects to uncertain forecasts that cause 
demand signal processing. Along with this structural cause, both above-mentioned 
behavioral causes play a role in the order amplification at each level of supply chain 
as one moves upstream from the market to distributor.  
The analysis of the results of variability of order quantity and order time 
intervals suggests that there is a range of low, medium, and high variability on the 
subjects’ decision indicators. Based on the observations in Table 4, the majority of 
retailers (67%) have medium variability of their replenishment decision indicators. 
Wholesalers behave differently. 17% of wholesalers have low variability of their 
replenishment indicators, while 33% of them introduce medium variability in their 
ordering behavior. Some of the distributors (25%) exhibit a medium variability, while 
the majority of them introduce high variability in their replenishment decision 
indicators. Although there are three subjects (R12, W10, D10) who follow the fixed 
order quantity and variable order time intervals ordering behavior, the majority of the 
subjects (91%) have variable order quantity and variable order time intervals ordering 
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behavior. Furthermore, on the echelon level, results show that retailer has low 
variability on order quantity and medium variability on order time intervals. 
Wholesaler shows medium variability on both order quantity and order time intervals. 
Distributor has a medium variability on order quantity and high variability on order 
time intervals. Hence, results from the both individual and echelon levels confirm that 
the variability of order quantity and order time intervals tends to increase while 
moving upstream from the market along the supply chain.  
 One interesting point remains to be discussed further; why do wholesaler 
behave differently? Prior work (Baganha and Cohen, 1998; Blinder 1981; Cachon et 
al., 2007; Rong et al., 2008; West, 1986) has highlighted that the variability of order 
quantity increases from retailer to wholesaler and decreases from wholesaler to 
manufacturer. This study confirms the difference in wholesaler ordering behavior, but 
it distinguishes form previous works since we observe a constant increase in the 
variability of order quantity, but a decrease in the variability of the wholesaler order 
time intervals at the echelon level. Moreover, at the individual level analysis, half of 
wholesalers (50%) in Table 3 and Table 4 are placed on the low and medium 
variability classification. These evidences, in connection with the previous discussion, 
reveal that wholesaler injects variability in order quantity and smoothen order time 
intervals under continuous review. Therefore, wholesalers perform a smoothing role 
in the middle of supply chain. 
 Subjects hold on-hand inventory to guard against unknown customer orders and 
unreliable supplier shipment. Since there is no price variation in our study, the main 
reason to hold on-hand inventory is to avoid stock-out and incurring backorder costs. 
The higher variability of the order quantity and order time intervals may lead to 
higher costs for both inventory manager and his/her supplier. Inventory managers’ on-
hand inventory depends on on-hand inventory availability at the upstream supplier, 
and time delays for ordering and shipment. As shown in Table 7, larger order 
quantities and longer order time intervals increase inventory manager holding and 
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backorder costs. The other important point is that replenishment policy of the most 
upstream echelon is decisive regarding the total cost of supply chain (see Table 5 and 
Table 6). The larger order quantity of distributor, the larger total costs of wholesaler 
and retailer. This observation also holds for distributor’s lengthened order time 
intervals.  
 Results in Table 8 suggest that a reduction in the variability of order quantity 
specifically for upstream echelons could help the distributor to cut unnecessary 
backorder and holding costs. Costs are more correlated to upstream echelons due to 
the higher variations of replenishment decision indicators. Result in Table 9 shows 
that the high variability of wholesaler replenishment decision indicators increases 
distributor backorder cost. Also, high variability of retailer order quantity increases 
wholesaler holding cost. Therefore, results suggest that reduction in the variability of 
customer order quantity significantly decreases the supplier total cost. 
 
7. Conclusion 
We conduct this research to examine the behavior of inventory managers under 
continuous review in decentralized supply chain. We design an experiment to control 
the environment. The experimental setting is characterized by unknown market 
demand and local information availability. This research makes a new contribution to 
inventory replenishment literature by revealing (i) the change in order time intervals 
along the supply chain, (ii) the smoothing role of wholesaler in the decentralized 
supply chain, (iii) the influence of inventory managers’ replenishment decisions on 
their own and the other echelons’ costs. 
 This work purposely focuses on individual and echelon levels. This focus 
restricts the possible conclusions concerning the supply chain ordering behavior and 
its global performance. Therefore, one possible extension would be team level 
analysis. The use of student subjects can be other limitation of this study. Although 
significant difference between student and professional subjects has not been reported 
(Croson and Donohue, 2006; Holweg and Bicheno, 2002), the authors have 
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experienced situations in which professional do tend to behave differently than 
students. Thus investigating potential deviations between these two categories is still 
worth investigation. Future research in this area may examine the robustness of our 
results in different supply chain contexts. Different experimental settings such as 
known demand to remove demand signal processing from structural causes of order 
amplification could help understanding the behavioral factors under continuous 
review.  
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Appendix A: experiment detailed set-up information 
 
Table A1. Detail set-up information of the experiment 
  Factory Distributor Wholesaler Retailer 
Initial On-hand inventory 
(unit) 9000 9000 9000 9000 
Holding cost ($/unit/day) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Backorder cost ($/unit/day) 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Ordering fixed cost ($) 15 15 15 15 
Item price ($) 4 6 8 10 
Benefit ($) 2 2 2 2 
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Chapter 3 !
 
Measuring Trust in Decentralized Supply Chain 
 
he main goal of this chapter is to develop a procedure to measure the level of trust 
among supply chain echelons over time. The following questions will be addressed in 
this chapter; 
1. Do inventory managers trust in their supplier or in their customer in a 
decentralized supply chain? 
2. How does the level of trust in customer change among echelons?  
3. How does the level of trust in supplier change among echelons? 
4. How does trust (in customer and in supplier) change over time? 
The findings of this chapter is partially presented at: 
Kaboli, A. Cheikhrouhou, N. Glardon, R., Measuring Trust in Supply Chain, 7the 
annual conference on Behavioral Research in Operations Management, June 9-
11, 2012, Washington, USA. 
 
 
  
T  
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Measuring Trust in Decentralized Supply Chain 
 
Abstract 
Trust is a significant role-playing factor in supplier-customer relationship and is 
known as a fundamental ingredient in supply chain. In this research, a multi-round 
trust measurement through questionnaires is administrated in the context of a 
laboratory experiment. We distinguish between trust in supplier and trust in customer 
and measure them in a serial multi-echelon inventory system. The validity and 
reliability of the proposed trust measurement are analyzed and its applicability 
demonstrated. Results show that trust does develop in decentralized supply chains, 
even in the absence of communication and with no access to market demand. It is 
found that trust level varies in a continuum of intensity and that trust evolves over 
time. Furthermore, we observe that trust in supplier is the lowest in the middle of the 
supply chain and that trust in customer decreases while moving upstream along a 
decentralized supply chain.  
 
Keywords: Trust perception, trust in supplier, trust in customer, decentralized supply 
chain 
 
1. Introduction 
Trust has received a great deal of attention in supply chain management and has been 
extensively investigated. Studies suggest that trust is linked to information sharing 
(Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Özer et al., 2011; Ebrahim-Khanjari et al., 2012), 
maintaining cooperation and avoiding conflicts (Kumar, 1996; Bachmann 2001, 
Spekman et al., 1998), as well as to transaction costs (Sako, 1994; Zaheer et al., 1998). 
  The level of trust among supply chain echelons plays an essential role (Sterman, 
2006). It has been proposed that a certain level of trust is needed in supply chain to 
increase predictability (Sako, 1994) and to develop cooperation (Dibben, 2000). Trust 
also guards supply chains against high inventories, order quantity amplification, and 
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poor customer services (Croson et al., 2012; Sterman, 2006). Echelons that trust each 
other generate greater profits and are more adaptable (Kumar, 1996). As a result, trust 
contributes to the long-term stability of a supply chain (Handfield and Bechtel, 2002). 
 Despite the acknowledged role of trust in supply chains, to the best of our 
knowledge, theoretical and/or empirical coherent attempts to measure trust across a 
decentralized supply chain have not been reported in the literature. The general 
objective of this work is the development of a procedure to measure the level of trust 
among supply chain echelons. Toward this end, a multi-round trust measurement 
procedure through questionnaires is administrated in the context of a laboratory 
experiment. We distinguish between trust in supplier and trust in customer and 
measure inventory managers’ trust in a decentralized supply chain. Since trust 
perception is measured over time, trend of trust development can be examined for 
each echelon. 
 The next section provides the literature related to trust measurement in supply 
chain. Section 3 describes the proposed method. Section 4 highlights the validity and 
reliability of the trust measurement. Section 5 deals with the results of the trust 
measurement in supply chain context. Section 6 discusses the results, underlines the 
findings, presents the limitations, and proposes future research directions.  
 
2. Research background 
2.1. Trust definition  
A review of the literature shows a number of different trust definitions in 
organizational sciences. Table 1 summarizes the most-quoted definitions of trust that 
present three main common points. The first point is the focus on the psychological 
state of the trustor. The second is the uncertainty of the outcome of trust that refers to 
the expectation of the trustor in future trustee’s action(s). The third communality of 
trust definitions is the context dependability of trust. Indeed, trust is a context-
dependent construct and may therefore change from one situation to another. 
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Table 1. Trust definitions 
Definition Author(s) 
The extent to which one is willing to ascribe good intentions to and have 
confidence in the words and actions of other people Cook and Wall (1980)  
One party’s belief that its needs will be fulfilled in the future by actions 
undertaken by the other party 
Anderson and Weitz 
(1989) 
Trust is a cognitive judgment about another's competence or reliability and 
an emotional bond of an individual towards the other person McAllister (1995) 
Trust is an individuals' behavioral reliance on another person under a 
condition of risk Currall and Judge (1995) 
Trust is an individual’s belief or a common belief among a group of 
individuals that another individual or group  
Cumming and Bromiley 
(1996)  
Trust is an expectancy of positive (non negative) outcomes that one can 
receive based on the expected action of another party in an interaction 
characterized by uncertainty 
Bhattacharya et al. 
(1998)  
Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior 
of another 
Rousseau et al. (1998)  
Trust reflects an expectation or belief that the other party will act 
benevolently Whitener et al. (1998)  
Trust is confident positive expectations regarding another’s conduct in a 
context of risk Lewicki et al. (1998) 
Trust is willingness of a party based on the expectations that the other 
party will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective 
of the ability to monitor or control the party 
Mayer and Davis (1999) 
Trust is a consumer’s confident belief that he or she can rely on the sellers 
to deliver promised services 
Agustin and Singh 
(2005)  
 
 The forms of trust that researchers have mostly theorized and implemented are 
belief, decision, and action (McEvily et al., 2003). Belief is the trustor expectation or 
the belief about trustee; thus, it is perceptual. Decision to trust refers the willingness 
to be vulnerable (Rousseau et al. 1998); thus, it is intentional. This means that if a 
decision maker considers her/his trustee to be trustworthy, (s)he decides to take the 
risk to be vulnerable toward trustee’s decisions and actions. The last form of trust, 
action, refers to the trustor’s action or behavior.  
 While trust literature has made significant advances in recent years, it is still not 
well integrated and lacks coherence (McEvily et al., 2003). Lack of integration and 
coherency in trust literature may be due to the inconsistency between the chosen 
definition and the form of trust. 
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2.2. Trust measurement 
Studies involving trust measurements have implemented different tools, depending on 
differences in the definitions and forms of trust, (McEvily and Tortoriello, 2011; 
Seppänen et al., 2007). In operations management, the predominant research tools to 
measure trust forms (belief, decision, action) are interviews, field data analysis, and 
psychometric tests. Experimental economists also examine trust. They mostly adopt 
Coleman’s definition1 for rational action of individuals in social situations (Coleman, 
1994) and implement trust in laboratory environments by using trust game (Berg et al., 
1995) and binary games (Güth et al., 1997). More details about trust and investment 
games can be found in Camerer (2011). Hereafter, we focus on trust measurement in 
operations management and marketing. 
 Anderson and Weitz (1989) investigate the trust perception of sellers in their 
manufacturers. They find that the level of communication in seller-manufacturer dyad 
has a strong influence on trust. Anderson and Narus (1990) examine trust perception 
of distributors in manufacturers and manufacturers in distributors. They find that 
cooperation and trust are closely linked. Crosby et al. (1990) study the belief of 
insurance policy buyers in sales agent. They find that the customer’s perception of the 
seller’s level of expertise has a significant impact on trust. Mohr and Spekman (1994) 
analyze dealers’ trust perception in their manufacturers. They find that greater level of 
trust guarantees successful partnership and alliance. McAllister (1995) investigates 
managers’ trust perception in their peers. He identifies that interpersonal trust has two 
principle dimensions; cognition-based and affect-base. Zaheer and Venkatraman 
(1995) examine trust perception of insurance agencies in their carriers. They show 
that the performance of inter-organizational exchange improves in the presence of 
trust. Doney and Cannon (1997) study trust perception in supplier-customer 
relationships. They argue that customer trust perception in buyer is related to supplier 
characteristics and the length of the relationship. Costa (2003) explores trust in work !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 “Trust is an action that involves the voluntary placement of resources such as; physical, financial, 
intellectual, or temporal at the disposal of the trustee with no real commitment from the trustee” 
(Coleman, 1994). 
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teams and proposes that team member’s attitude towards the organization is strongly 
related to work team trust.  
 Mayer et al. (1995) propose a model for the relationship between trust and 
interpersonal behavior. They show that trustor’s belief about trustee’s ability, 
benevolence, and integrity result in a willingness to take risk. Mayer and Davis (1999) 
examine top management-employee relationships and empirically test the model 
proposed by Mayer et al. (1995). They suggest that implementing an acceptable 
performance appraisal system increases employee’s trust level in the management 
board. Gillespie (2003) identifies reliance and disclosure as salient forms of trusting 
behavior in working relationships. Özer et al. (2011) measure trusting behavior in an 
experimental setting and show that contrary to the mathematical prediction, human 
subjects show deviations from being self-interested in repeated interactions. In 
particular, they find that human subjects behave altruistically in revealing information, 
even when there are some incentives to keep and hide demand forecast information. 
Ebrahim-Khanjari et al. (2012) model the trusting behavior of a retailer and 
wholesaler. They show that retailer tends to trust wholesaler in long-term 
relationships and that benevolent and honest wholesaler improves supply chain 
performance.  
 Previous studies mostly focus on single or dyadic relationships and there is little 
research on measuring trust across a multi-echelon supply chain. Moreover, 
researchers mainly focus on measuring trust at a single period of time, as a static 
concept, and less attention has been paid to considering trust over time. In this paper, 
we consider inventory manager’s trust perception within a decentralized supply chain. 
We measure their trust over time to examine the trust level ranges and changes over 
time. Measuring inventory managers’ trust allows a better understanding of the 
behavior of trust in customer and trust in supplier along the supply chain. 
 
3. Method 
3.1. Decentralized supply chain 
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We consider a linear supply chain as schematically represented in Figure 1. Inventory 
is managed in each echelon with local information under continuous inventory review. 
Local information means each inventory manager is provided with the following 
information; received orders from downstream customer, on-hand inventory, placed 
orders to upstream supplier, shipments of upstream supplier, and shipments to 
downstream customer. Continuous inventory review means that inventory is 
monitored continuously and orders can be placed at any time. This implies that, in a 
continuous review system, both order quantity and order time intervals are variable.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The structure of the supply chain 
 
Each echelon operates as follows: 
- The inventory managers receives customer orders from its downstream customer 
- If on-hand inventory is sufficient; the customer order is filled and shipped; 
otherwise, the customer order is backlogged.  
- A replenishment order of any size can be sent at any time to the upstream supplier. 
There is no partial delivery; i.e. delivery of the exact ordered quantity is required. 
The Retailer receives costumer orders from the market. Factory replenishment orders 
are sent to production, which delivers the orders after a fixed production lead-time (2 
days).   
There are two types of lead-times for retailer, wholesaler, and distributor echelons: 
-  an ordering lead-time: 1 day delay between order placement by the customer and 
order receipt by the supplier. 
- a shipment lead-time: 2 days delay between order shipment by the supplier and 
order receipt by the customer. 
Each echelon has to deal with the following cost and earning elements: 
- Purchasing cost paid to supplier after material receipt, proportional to the received 
Retailer Distributor Wholesaler Factory Market 
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quantity. 
- Holding cost proportional to stored quantity and time. 
- Backorder cost paid to customer for backlogged orders, proportional to quantity 
and time. 
- Sales revenue received from costumer for delivered material, proportional to 
delivered quantity. 
- Backorder income paid by supplier for backlogged orders, proportional to quantity 
and time. 
The echelon profit is equal to the difference between the sum of the earnings and the 
sum of the costs. The subjects’ goal is to maximize their local profit.  
 We implement a role-playing simulation platform developed by Montreuil et al. 
(2008) to mimic the decentralized supply chain. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of 
the supply chain. Dotted lines indicate orders, solid lines indicate shipments, filled 
rectangles represent echelons operated by human participants and empty rectangles 
represent echelons run by computer agents. Human participants, thereafter called 
subjects, play the roles of the retailer, wholesaler and distributor and computer agents 
are used for factory and market. None of the subjects are aware of this fact. Moreover, 
the market demand is characterized by a normally distributed daily demand rate with 
a mean of 3000 units/day and a standard deviation of 500 units/day, truncated at zero. 
Each daily demand quantity is stochastically divided into two single orders. 
 
3.2. Trust measurement approach 
We draw on prior literature in defining trust as “one party’s belief that its needs will 
be fulfilled in the future by actions undertaken by the other party " Anderson and 
Weitz, 1989). In the considered supply chain context, the features of trust in a supplier 
and trust in a customer are different. Therefore, we specify trust in supplier as 
inventory manager’s belief that her/his needs will be fulfilled in the future by actions 
undertaken by the supplier and trust in customer as inventory manager’s belief that 
her/his needs will be fulfilled in the future by actions undertaken by the customer. 
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Therefore, two questionnaires are developed to capture the inventory manager trust in 
his/her supplier (Ts) and customer (Tc).  
 Trust is a context-dependent construct (Hardin, 2002; Rousseau et al., 1998) and 
measures of trust might vary in different settings (McEvily and Tortoriello, 2011). 
Considering our experimental setting characterized by decentralized supply chain 
with local information availability, trust items were pooled2 and adapted to the 
context of the study from a number of sources (Table 2).   
 
Table 2. Selected items and wordings used for the trust construct 
# Item Item wording Source 
1 Intention 
My supplier (customer) will not use 
opportunities that arise to take advantage at my 
expense 
Crosby et al. 1990; 
Kennedy et al. 2001 
2 Competence My supplier (customer) knows how to efficiently manage his/her company Boles et al. 1996 
3 Commitment My supplier (customer) is committed to on-time delivery (stable ordering behavior) 
Crosby et al. 1990; Zaheer 
and Venkatramon 1995; 
Cummings and Bromiley 
1996 
4 Reputation My supplier (customer) has reputation for on-time delivery (stable ordering behavior) 
Ganesan 1994; Plank et al. 
1999; Doney and Cannon 
1997 
 
 The trust construct is based on four items: intention, competence, commitment, 
and reputation. The number of considered items is voluntarily kept small to avoid any 
problem with response biases (Hinkin, 1995; Schmitt and Stults, 1985; Schriesheim 
and Eisenbach, 1990), to reduce the respondent fatigue (Anastasi and Urbina, 1997), 
and to decrease the development and implementation time (Carmines and Zeller 
1979). 
 The chosen item wordings are the result of previous pilot experiments (Kaboli 
et al. 2012). The subjects are asked to evaluate the items on a seven-point Likert scale 
(from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Reverse-scored items, negatively 
worded items, are not employed because of the two following reasons. First, reverse-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 We refer the reader for the details on scale development to Hinkin (1995) and DeVellis (2003). !
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scored trust items may lead to mistrust (Cordery and Sevastos, 1993; Wrightsman, 
1991), which is out of the scope of this study. Second, it may reduce the items validity 
(Schriesheim and Hill, 1981), the reliability and accuracy (Schriesheim et al., 1991), 
and cause systematic error to a scale (Jackson et al., 1993).  
 
3.3. Procedure 
Data for the study are collected through questionnaires administrated in the context of 
the laboratory experiment. In the experiment, three subjects play the roles of 
inventory managers of the distributor, wholesaler and retailer. Therefore, six trust 
levels are measured (three levels for the trust in customer, Tc and three levels for the 
trust in supplier, Ts) as shown in Figure 2. 
 The experiment proceeds as follows: Subjects enter to the laboratory at an 
appointed time and are randomly assigned to their team and their role. Before starting 
the experiment, each subject is provided with a handout (4-5 pages) explaining the 
experimental procedure and presenting the simulation platform features. After reading 
the instructions, subjects’ questions are answered, and the simulation platform 
interface is presented. Then, subjects are asked to participate in two initial rounds of 
the experiment as a warm-up exercise. After warm-up, the subjects are asked to 
answer a short quiz in order to assure a sufficient level of understanding about the 
experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Trust measurements in the supply chain 
 
 Being assured that the subjects understand the questionnaires, the simulation 
platform, and the experiment procedure, the main experiment is started (see Figure 3). 
Trust in supplier (Tsr) 
Retailer Distributor Factory Wholesaler Market 
Trust in supplier (Tsw) 
Trust in customer (Tcw) Trust in customer (Tcd) Trust in customer (Tcr) 
Trust in supplier (Tsd) 
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To evaluate the evolution of trust during the game, the experiment is divided into 
eight rounds of approximately seven minutes, providing 16 trust measurements for 
each inventory manager; eight measures for trust in supplier and eight measures for 
trust in customer. The experiment is stopped at the beginning of each round and 
subjects are asked to fill form A (customer trust in her/ his supplier) and form B 
(supplier trust in her/ his customer).  
          
 
 
Figure 3. The procedure of trust measurement in the main experiment 
   
 To reduce the risk of response bias, the item statements order in both 
questionnaires changes at each round. At the end of the experiment, subjects are asked 
to fill a post-experiment questionnaire to explain their replenishment decision strategy 
(-ies) and finally they are paid based on the attained performance. The duration of the 
experiment is not announced in advance in order to avoid end behavior. 
 
3.4. Subjects  
Forty-eight undergraduate and graduate students from two Swiss Universities EPFL 
and UNIL (engineering and business majors) participate in this experiment for payoff 
contingent on performance. The subjects consist of 39% women and 61% men, with 
24% of students in their bachelor, 54% in their master, and 22% in their PhD. As 
shown in Equation (1), in addition to a fix payment of 10 CHF for showing up to the 
experiment, the subjects could earn, on the basis of their performance, up to 50 CHF.  
 
Earning = min {Show-up fee (10 CHF) + 40 CHF * ( !"#$!!"#$%&!"#$%&#!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$!!"#$%&), 50 CHF} (1) 
 
4. Validity and reliability analysis  
The analysis is conducted at the echelon level. The data set consists of 16 supply 
Start 
Ts1, Tc1 Ts2, Tc2 Ts8, Tc8 
End Round 1 Round 2 Rest of experiment Round 8 
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chains. We eliminate four supply chains from our sample since the examination of    
the post-experiment questionnaire shows that there is at least one subject in these four 
supply chains who misunderstand the experiment and the decision task. Therefore, we 
report on the results of 12 supply chains, 36 subjects, over 8 rounds, building 96 
observations for each echelon or 288 total observations. Statistical analysis is carried 
out using the SPSS version 21. 
 The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of the sampling adequacy and 
Barttlett test of sphericity are used to indicate whether the obtained data on trust in 
supplier and trust in customer are suitable for factor analysis or not (Dziuban and 
Shirkey, 1974; Kaiser, 1974). Factor analysis allows an investigator to assess the 
validity of measurement test. It helps to determine smaller number of factors among a 
set of inter-related items (DeVellis, 2003). 
 Results (see Table 3) show that KMO measures are between 0.712 to 0.778 for 
trust in supplier; for trust in customer they range between 0.660 to 0.779. KMO 
measure for sampling adequacy should be located between 0.6 and 1 for satisfactory 
factor analysis (Kaiser, 1974).  
     
Table 3. Sample adequacy and sphericity tests 
    Trust in supplier (Ts) Trust in customer (Tc) 
Tests Measures D W R D W R 
KMO Sample 
adequacy KMO  0.712 0.778 0.753  0.660  0.779 0.670  
!  ! ! ! ! ! !
Barttlett ‘s test 
of sphericity 
χ2(df=6) 211.22  210.9 196.65  194.16  270.59 139.12 
P-value  < 0.001  < 0.001   < 0.001   < 0.001   < 0.001   < 0.001 
  
 Barttlett test of sphericity is a Chi-squre (χ2) test that examine whether there is 
correlation among the items. Therefore, if there is no relationship among the items, 
the correlation matrix should be an identity matrix. The critical value of the χ2 with 
df=6 is 12.59. Results of Barttlett test of sphericity (see Table 4) show that χ2(df=6) 
range between 139.12 to 270.59 and four-item correlation matrixes are highly 
significant (p < .001).. Acceptable values of KMO measure and Barttlett’s test 
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demonstrate that sample data are appropriate for conducting factor analysis (Hair et 
al., 1998, p.619). 
 To demonstrate the validity of the measurement, we conduct the explanatory 
factor analysis with a varimax rotation on the four items (see Table 3). Results show 
that all four items have eigenvalue greater than one, explaining total variance ranging 
from 60% to 75% (Kaiser, 1960, p.145; Sharma, 1996, p.120; Hair et al., 1995, p.385). 
Moreover, the scree test (Cattell, 1966) is applied to further check the number of 
factors that should be considered. The scree test results also suggest only one factor 
for each of trust in supplier and trust in customer at each echelon. Considering the 
item factor loading above 0.30, all items are retained to measure trust in supplier and 
trust in customer.  
 
Table 4. Factor loading 
! Ts Tc 
Items D W R D W R 
1. Intention  0.319 0.552 0.431  0.378 0.819 0.526 
2. Competence 0.843 0.875 0.893   0.756 0.772  0.771 
3. Commitment  0.934 0.922 0.935 0.921 0.931  0.897 
4. Reputation  0.940  0.919  0.89   0.937 0.94 0.864 
Variation explained (%)  64.22 69.13   66.23 61.04  75.40  60.54  
 
 One might ask what is the acceptable cut-off for an item factor loading to be 
retained? It seems there is no answer for the lower and higher bound of an item factor 
loading (Comrey and Lee, 1992) and scholars utilize factor loading thresholds based 
on their experiences. However, in the social and behavioral sciences, 0.30 is the 
minimum acceptable threshold (Merenda, 1997; Hair et al., 1998, p.111).   !
 To check the reliability of the measurement, we assess corrected item-total 
correlations, and internal consistency reliability (Churchill, 1979; DeVellis, 2003). 
Corrected item-total correlation tests the consistency of each item with the average 
behavior of the other items and internal consistency reliability deals with the 
homogeneity of the items within a scale (here trust) and is measured with Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951; DeVellis, 2003, p.27).  
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 Table 5 and Table 6 list the measurement items, means, standard deviation, 
corrected item-total correlations, and Cronbach’s coefficient alphas for trust in 
supplier and trust in customer, respectively. The minimum corrected item-total 
correlation belongs to intention and is 0.20 for trust in supplier (Table 4) and 0.23 for 
trust in customer (Table 5). Recommended minimum for corrected item-total 
correlation is 0.30 (Ferketich, 1991). However, a minimum of 0.20 is justifiable since 
deleting intention from the trust scale does not lead to a substantial increase in 
Cronbach’s coefficient alphas. Therefore, it is retained in the trust scale.  
 
Table 5. Reliability evaluation for measurement of trust in supplier  
Echelon Items Mean Std. Deviation 
Corrected item-
total correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Retailer 
Intention 4.98 1.322 0.285 0.823 
Competence 4.16 1.761 0.756  
Commitment 4.45 1.794 0.833  
Reputation 4.27 1.701 0.752  
      
Wholesaler 
Intention 4.5 1.692 0.39 0.84 
Competence 4.08 1.646 0.728  
Commitment 3.93 1.784 0.815  
Reputation 3.73 1.767 0.802  
      
Distributor 
Intention 4.4 1.454 0.202 0.784 
Competence 4.63 1.371 0.648  
Commitment 4.85 1.661 0.795  
Reputation 4.69 1.605 0.801   
 
 Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (α) ranges between 0 to 1. Ranges for research 
scales are as follows: α < 0.6, unacceptable; 0.60 < α < 0.65 are undesirable; 0.65 < α 
< 0.70, minimally acceptable; 0.70 < α < 0.80, respectable; 0.80 < α < 0.90, very 
good; 0.90 < α, one should consider shortening the scale (DeVellis, 2003, p.95). 
Increase of Cronbach’s coefficient alpha is partially dependent upon the extent of 
covariation among the items, the number of items (DeVellis, 2003, p.97), and Likert-
type scales (using five-point Likert scale increases Cronbach’s coefficient alpha 
(Hinkin, 1995). All Cronbach’s coefficient alphas are within the acceptance range. 
Consequently, results of Table 5 and Table 6 indicate a high degree of reliability of 
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the trust measurements. 
 Note that in 7-point Likert scale 1 represents strongly disagree; 7 represents 
strongly agree; and 4 is the midpoint. Though the inclusion of the midpoint is 
necessary in the scale measurement to provide a neutral option to the subjects (Matell 
and Jacoby, 1971), one might argue that considering the midpoint on Likert scale 
which refers to “neither agree and nor disagree” may increase the positive rating 
(Worcester and Burns, 1975), distort the results and consequently affect the research 
findings (Garland, 1991). 
 
Table 6. Reliability evaluation for measurement of trust  in customer  
Echelon Items Mean Std. Deviation 
Corrected item-
total correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Retailer 
Intention 4.73 1.418 0.339 0.77 
Competence 4.94 1.177 0.574  
Commitment 4.17 1.633 0.724  
Reputation 4.44 1.471 0.699  
      
Wholesaler 
Intention 4.05 1.997 0.69 0.889 
Competence 4.68 1.599 0.627  
Commitment 3.68 1.922 0.86  
Reputation 3.65 1.963 0.873  
      
Distributor 
Intention 4.19 1.669 0.234 0.763 
Competence 3.67 1.574 0.534  
Commitment 3.36 1.898 0.756  
Reputation 3.54 1.771 0.793  
 
 To further validate the findings and evaluate whether or not the midpoint should 
be included on trust in supplier and trust in customer scales, we separately check the 
effect of exclusion of the midpoint on the trust measurement validity and reliability. 
Since the exclusion of the midpoint increases slightly the reliability without a 
significant change on the validity of the measurement, we decide to include the 
midpoint (for more detail please refer to Change, 1994; Cronbach, 1950, p. 22). 
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5. Results 
So far, we checked the sampling adequacy, the suitability for conducting factor 
analysis, and the validity and reliability of the trust measurement. In this section we 
review the applicability of the proposed trust measurement process. To this end, we 
provide results of an experiment and seek to explain the observations related to trust 
in supplier and trust in customer across echelons. Table 7 provides the descriptive 
statistics, as well as the percentage of scoring above and below the scale midpoint 
over the 8 rounds for all three echelons.  
    
Table 7: Descriptive statistics over 8 rounds (N=96 for each echelon) 
! ! Trust in supplier (Ts) Trust in customer (Tc) 
Status Measures D W R D W R 
With 
midpoint 
Mean 4.64 4.06 4.46 3.69 4.01 4.57 
SD 1.19 1.41 1.34 1.32 1.63 1.1 
Median 4.75 4.12 4.75 3.75 4 4.75 
Above 
midpoint 70.80% 50% 60.40% 41.70% 46.90% 62.50% 
Below 
midpoint 26% 43.80% 35% 54.20% 47.90% 29.20% 
Without 
midpoint 
Mean 4.71 4.03 4.46 3.64 3.98 4.61 
SD 1.42 1.54 1.45 1.51 1.73 1.33 
Median 5 4.25 5 3.67 4 5 
Above 
midpoint 70.20% 50.50% 59.40% 31.60% 50.50% 57.40% 
Below 
midpoint 26.6% 44.20% 35.40% 45.30% 44.20% 23.40% 
  
 The first part of Table 7 shows results with midpoint, and the second part 
illustrates results without midpoint. Recall that Likert scale falls within the ordinal 
level of measurement and that for ordinal data it has been recommended to employ 
the median as the measure of central tendency (Clegg, 1998). Though there is a 
debate among methodologists that a Likert scale (and not Likert item) can be 
considered as grouped form of a continuous scale, we prefer to employ median as a 
core measure to represent results and to draw conclusions.  
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Analyses of the obtained lead to the following observations: 
 
Observation 1: The level of trust among echelons varies along a continuum of 
intensity. 
 
Figure 4 displays the histogram of trust in supplier and Figure 5 shows the histogram 
of trust in customer for each echelon. Results reveal that trust in supplier and trust in 
customer exist in decentralized supply chain with local information, unknown 
supplier and customer, and unknown market demand. They further indicate that trust 
can vary from 1 (low trust) to 7 (high trust) on the trust-scale values. Thus trust can be 
considered as a continuum in a decentralized supply chain instead of no-trust and full-
trust levels. 
!   
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4: (a) histogram of trust in supplier for distributor, (b) wholesaler, and (c) retailer 
 
   
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 5: (a) histogram of trust in customer for distributor, (b) wholesaler, and (c) retailer 
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 Note that ordinary statistical tests assume independent and identically 
distributed observations, our experimental data however fails to satisfy the 
independence assumption. In other words, our data include several trust measures 
made on the same individual over time, thus we implement linear mixed effect model 
to compare the trust level among echelons. In this occasion and everywhere from now 
on, to fit a linear mixed effect model, a random intercept is injected into the model for 
each individual to take the interdependence of observations, corresponding to the 
same individual, into account (Diggle et al. 2013, p.126). Furthermore, fit adequacy is 
assessed for all fitted models using graphical tools. 
 
Observation 2: Wholesaler has the lowest trust in supplier in a decentralized supply 
chain. 
Results in Table 7 show that wholesaler has the lowest mean and median trust in 
supplier. To check whether this observation is statistically significant, we implement 
the linear mixed effect model. The test results confirm that trust in supplier is 
significantly the lowest in a decentralized supply chain (F=5.449, p= 0.005). In 
particular, the level of trust in supplier is higher for retailer than for wholesaler 
(Estimate=0.401, t=2.235, p=0.05) and trust in supplier is significantly higher for 
distributor than for wholesaler (Estimate=0.578, t=3.222, p=0.001).  Figure 6 
illustrates observation 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Trust in supplier 
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Observation 3: Trust in customer decreases while moving upstream along a 
decentralized supply chain. 
Results in Table 7 indicate that mean and median of retailer’s trust in customer are the 
highest and that mean and median of trust in customer decrease from retailer to 
distributor. To test whether this difference is significant, we use the linear mixed 
effect model. Results show that trust in customer significantly decreases while 
moving from retailer, wholesaler to distributor (F=12.909, p= 0.0001). In particular, 
the level of trust in customer is higher for retailer than for wholesaler (Estimate=0.554, 
t=3.175, p=0.005) and trust in customer is significantly lower for distributor than for 
wholesaler (Estimate=-0.322, t=-1.848, p=0.1). Figure 7 illustrates the observation 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Trust in customer 
 
Observation 4: Trust evolves over time in a decentralized supply chain. 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 display the median of trust in supplier and trust in customer 
over each round of the experiment. Figure 8 indicates that the median of trust in 
supplier starts from (3.75, 4.63, 4.25) and ends up at (4.88, 4.13, 5.00) for distributor, 
wholesaler and retailer respectively. As shown in Figure 9, the median of trust in 
customer starts from (3.13, 3.38, 4.38) and ends up at (3.63, 4.76, 5.00) for distributor, 
wholesaler, and retailer respectively. Figure 8 and Figure 9 clearly show that trust 
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evolves over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Median of trust in customer over each round of the experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Median of trust in supplier over each round of the experiment 
 
 The linear mixed Effect model is used to examine the trust trend over time. The 
results of this analysis are summarized in Table 8. They indicate that distributor’s 
trust in supplier and wholesaler’s trust in customer significantly grows over time, 
whereas the other four trust measures do not show a significant variation over time.
      
Table 8: Trust trend analysis of trust measures over 8 rounds (N=96) 
!! Trust in supplier (Ts) Trust in customer (Tc) 
Parameter D W R D W R 
Round 0.135 0.039 0.0456 0.0126 0.121 0.015 
P-value 0.0012 n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.0015 n.s. 
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6. Discussion and conclusion  
The present study examines trust in a decentralized supply chain. The study provides 
several noteworthy methodological and theoretical issues. The research is designed to 
measure trust in the context of a laboratory experiment. The main reasons for using a 
laboratory experiment are that it is a stable and controlled environment and that it 
provides repeatable and reliable observations. In particular, in the research design, it 
allows us to control the level of communication among the subjects and eliminate 
possible noises such as asymmetric power regime among the echelons. For instance, 
we set equal backorder and holding costs for each echelon to avoid this possible noise 
on examining trust. 
 We measure trust in supplier and trust in customer over time through 
questionnaires. Results suggest that trust exists in a serial supply chain, with local 
information, no communication, and no access to the market demand. They also 
suggest that trust level varies in a continuum of intensity in a decentralized supply 
chain. We find trust evolves and for some echelons it grows over time. Furthermore, 
we observe that trust in supplier is the lowest in the middle of supply chain and that 
trust in customer decreases while moving upstream along a decentralized supply chain. 
 
6.1. Methodological issues  
We disentangle trust in supplier and trust in customer and measure them through 
questionnaires. Trust items are pooled, selected, and accordingly worded from 
previous research to build the trust construct regarding the research design and 
context. The choice of scale length is guided by two main considerations: response 
biases and subject fatigue over the experiment. Particularly among the impatience 
student subjects it necessitated the use of small items. KMO measure of the sample 
adequacy, Barttlett test of sphericity, and adequate internal consistency reliability of 
the scale assure that we minimize the risk of the response biases and the subject 
fatigue. 
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 The 7-point Likert scale is used to present and format items. It is a widely used 
scale to measure beliefs and opinions ranging from strong disagreement to strong 
agreement with a natural midpoint. In this study, inclusion and exclusion of the 
midpoint on Likert scale which refers to “neither agree and nor disagree” is analyzed 
and statistical tests prove the validity and reliability of the proposed trust 
measurement. Though the results suggest that the exclusion of the midpoint does not 
increase the reliability and the validity of the measurement at the same time, we 
propose for future studies to include a “no option” answer for the subjects to obtain a 
more clear view of the neutrality case. 
 
6.2. Theoretical issues  
In economics and sociology, it is usually assumed that subjects are rational, self-
interested and they do not trust if there is no way to communicate, reciprocate, and 
penalize their counterpart’s odd behaviors (Camerer, 2011). Therefore, based on this 
reasoning, inventory managers neither trust in their customer nor in their supplier in 
decentralized supply chain. The proportion of strong and weak views about trust in 
supplier and trust in customer on Table 6 shows that contrarily to the standard 
assumption in game theory, subjects trust in decentralized supply chain, and not all 
subjects are self-interested, nor are they reluctant to trust even if there is no way to 
communicate and access to market demand.  
 The obtained results show that inventory managers’ trust levels vary within a 
continuum of intensity in a decentralized supply chain and there is no binary state of 
trust as no-trust and full-trust levels. Our research design allows us to study the levels 
of trust in supplier and trust in customer across the supply chain. We find that trust in 
customer decreases while moving upstream along a decentralized supply chain. Also, 
we find that wholesaler has the lowest trust in supplier in a decentralized supply chain.!
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! Results also show that trust evolves over time. They further imply that trust for 
distributor (Tsd) and wholesaler (Tcw) grow in a decentralized supply chain. This 
finding shows that over time, interactions between supplier and customer allow 
subjects, in particular upstream echelons, to learn more about their customer ordering 
and their supplier delivery patterns and to gain more experience on regulating their 
inventory, even without communication. Thus it appears that the experience gained 
over time about supplier and customer influences the trust levels in a decentralized 
supply chain mostly in upstream supply chain. 
 This study has some limitations that provide several opportunities for future 
research. One potential limitation of our study is that we measure trust based on four 
items. Although it is a reasonable first step, other items for measuring trust in supply 
chain, depending on the context, decentralized or coordinated, are worth examining. 
The other limitation is that this study is based on experimental data from student 
subjects and not professional inventory managers. Although Croson (2007) reports 
some evidences of better performance of professional versus student subjects, we 
believe that this does not question the proposed methodological approach.  
 The findings of this study suggest that inventory replenishment decision-making 
may be more complex than previously assumed. Specially, this study provides 
evidence that trust levels change among the supply chain echelons and consequently 
that this might have a significant influence on the related replenishment decisions. To 
develop a more comprehensive understanding of the effect of trust in decentralized 
supply chain, further work is needed. It may examine the link between trust and 
inventory replenishment decision for each role. Another extension would be 
considering two different treatments in warm-up session; one in low trust and the 
other in high trust condition. Then examining how trust evolves in both groups. It 
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would also be interesting to investigate how trust in supply chain breaks and how to 
measure mistrust. In this paper, we examine trust in decentralized supply chain. The 
proposed procedure can serve in further researches as a reliable measurement of trust 
to study the links between trust, replenishment policies and decisions, as well as 
supply chain performances and cost.  
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Chapter 4 !
 
The Impact of Trust on Inventory Replenishment Decision and 
Extended Inventory  
 
he main goal of this research is to examine the link between trust in customer, 
trust in supplier, and the inventory manager’s replenishment decision. The following 
questions will be addressed in this chapter; 
1. Does trust (in customer or in supplier) of the inventory manager affect her/his 
inventory replenishment decisions? If so, how? 
2. Is there any link between the inventory manager’s trust perception (in 
supplier or customer) and her/his extended inventory? 
The findings of this chapter is partially presented at: 
Kaboli, A. Cheikhrouhou, N. Glardon, R. Darvish, M. 2012. An Experimental 
Study of the Relationship between Trust and Inventory Replenishment in Triadic 
Supply Chain. The 4th Production and Operations Management World 
Conference, July 1-5, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. 
Kaboli, A. Cheikhrouhou, N. Glardon, R. 2012. The Relationship between Trust 
and Inventory Replenishment in Supplier-Customer Dyad: An Experimental Study. 
4th International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics and Supply 
Chain, August 26-29, Quebec, Canada. 
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The Impact of Trust on Inventory Replenishment Decision and Extended 
Inventory  
 
Abstract 
Trust has a substantial impact in supply chain relationships. While the effect of trust 
on supply chain performance has been extensively studied, relatively little is known 
about the link between trust, inventory replenishment decision-making, and inventory 
behavior. This paper examines the impact of inventory manager’ trust perception on 
their replenishment decision and their extended inventory. We design an experiment 
with unknown market demand, local information, and under continuous 
replenishment review. We analyze the experimental data on the individual and 
echelon levels. We find that lower trust in customer leads to higher order quantity, 
lengthen order time intervals, and higher extended inventory at the individual levels. 
Results at the echelon level also show some supports. Moreover, our results show that 
inventory managers prefer to hold higher inventory level when they have lower trust 
in their upstream supplier. We find that distributor exhibits the lowest trust in 
customer, highest order quantity and longest order time intervals among echelons. 
Furthermore, we find that retailer is the only echelon that considers trust in supplier 
while placing order quantities to upstream supplier.  
 
Keywords: Trust, inventory replenishment decision, supply chain relationships, 
experiment, behavioral operations management. 
 
1. Introduction 
Trust has a substantial impact in supply chain relationships. Previous research 
findings in operations management have shown that trust is a fundamental ingredient 
in building and maintaining cooperation (Bachmann 2001) and a significant 
contributor to the long-term stability of a supply chain (Handfield and Bechtel 2002). 
! 73 
But, why should trust matter within a supply chain? The most obvious answer is that 
trust can reduce perceived relational risk between the supplier and customer (Das and 
Teng 1998). Trust also can increase confidence in the inventory manager that short-
term disruptions will be resolved (Ganesan 1994). Hence, echelons that trust each 
other may generate greater profits and exhibit more adaptability (Kumar 1996).  
 While the effect of trust on supply chain performance has been extensively studied 
(Handfield and Bechtel 2002; Panayides and Venus 2009), relatively little is known 
about the link between inventory manager’s trust perception, their replenishment 
decision and their extended inventory.  
 Recognition of the importance of inventory replenishment decision and its 
significant effect on supply chain performance has grown in recent years, evidenced 
by an abundance of published work attempting to understand the phenomenon from 
both normative and behavioral perspectives (Aviv 2003; Croson and Donohue 2003; 
Croson and Donohue 2006; Croson et al. 2012; Oliva and Gonçalves 2005; Sterman 
1989; Wu and Katok 2006). 
 Various periodic and continuous inventory replenishment models have been 
proposed for optimal ordering policies (Aviv 2003; Clark and Scarf 1960; De Bodt 
and Graves 1985; Federgruen and Zipkin 1984). Nevertheless, the actual behavior of 
an inventory manager tends to deviate from optimal ordering policies (Loch and Wu 
2005; Gino and Pisano 2008; Simon 1969).  
 If following optimal ordering policies satisfies downstream customer demand and 
minimizes total costs in supply chain, why do inventory managers’ decisions deviate 
from the optimal policy? Evidence from supply chain laboratory experiments show 
that decision makers have a cognitive limitation to formulate inventory replenishment 
decision-making problems in a finite time on the basis of available information 
(Bolton and Katok 2005; Croson and Donohue 2006; Sterman 2006).   
 Research from several literature streams addresses inventory replenishment 
decision-making problem. It highlights that the mismatch arising between supply and 
demand at each echelon can exacerbate order quantity and order time at upstream 
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echelons and lead to order quantity and order time interval amplifications (Blinder 
1981; Chen 1999; Chen and Lee 2012; Croson and Donohue 2006, Kaboli et al. 
2013a; Sterman 1989; Towill 1991). 
 Supply and demand mismatch (also known as order or demand amplification, 
Forrester effect, and bullwhip effect) is caused by structural and behavioral reasons. 
Lee et al. (1997) introduces the following characteristics that cause demand 
amplification; demand signal processing, order batching, price variation, and 
inventory rationing. These four reasons are structural causes of demand amplification. 
Decision maker bounded rationality to account for time lags and previous decisions 
feedbacks (Sterman 1989) and uncertainty of individual decisions for the other supply 
chain members (Croson et al. 2012) are behavioral characteristics that amplify order 
variability.  
 Moreover, Sterman (1989) identifies that inventory managers place orders to (1) 
fill customer orders, (2) reduce the gap between desired and actual on-hand inventory 
levels, and (3) maintain an adequate supply line of open orders. Therefore, the 
extended inventory can be attributed to the inventory manager’s response to supply 
and demand mismatch with backlog avoidance (Kahn 1992). Given that, it can be 
expected that changes in the inventory managers’ trust will influence her/his 
inventory replenishment decision, as inventory managers seek to hold enough 
inventory to reduce the cost of demand and supply uncertainties. Therefore, 
understanding how trust affects inventory replenishment decisions and extended 
inventory is pivotal for research and practice. 
 The purpose of this paper is thus to address the following two important issues. 
First, does trust (in customer or in supplier) of the inventory manager affect her/his 
inventory replenishment decisions? At this point, to the best of our knowledge, there 
is no evidence in the inventory management literature to substantiate the proposition 
that a higher level of trust in supplier or customer results in lower order quantities and 
shorter order time intervals. Second, this study seeks whether there is a link between 
the inventory manager’s trust perception (in supplier or customer) and her/his 
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extended inventory? A clear answer for this proposition advances prior research 
studies on inventory managers’ tendency to hold higher or lower inventory. 
 In addressing these two important issues, this study contributes to the literature on 
the effect of trust on inventory decisions and extended inventory. Given the effect of 
demand and supply uncertainty on supply chain decisions (Lee et al. 1997; Tomlin 
2009), understanding the role of trust perception on these decisions is particularly 
important for research and practice.   
 The next section provides the related literature. Section 3 describes the research 
method. Section 4 highlights the statistical analyses. Section 5 reports the results. 
Section 6 concludes the paper, underlines the findings, presents the limitations, and 
proposes future research directions.  
 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
In this section, we survey literature on the link between trust, inventory replenishment 
decisions, and extended inventory. Based on existing theory, we develop a model for 
relationships between these variables. The model and hypotheses are depicted in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The hypothesized relationships. 
2.1. Trust 
 Despite different trust definitions in the literature, researchers mostly conceptualize 
and measure trust as trustor’s belief or perception on trustee’s good intention and 
proper action (McAllister 1995; Whitener et al. 1998). Furthermore, most of the 
extant literature has focused on either trust in customer or trust in supplier, while 
H4 
H1 
Trust in supplier 
Trust in customer 
Extended inventory 
Inventory replenishment decision 
st in customer 
H3 
H2 
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studies that simultaneously examine both are scarce (Johnston et al. 2004).  
 In this study, we consider both trust in customer and trust in supplier and draw on 
prior literature in defining trust as “one party’s belief that its needs will be fulfilled in 
the future by actions undertaken by the other party " Anderson and Weitz 1989). The 
focal referent of an inventory manager’s trust is the downstream customer and 
upstream supplier. Thus, we specify trust in customer as inventory manager’s belief 
that her/his needs will be fulfilled in the future by actions undertaken by the customer 
and trust in supplier as inventory manager’s belief that her/his needs will be fulfilled 
in the future by actions undertaken by the supplier.  
 Trust in downstream customer and trust in upstream supplier are meaningful 
concepts in supply chain relationships. Since supply chain echelons are 
interconnected and an echelon profit is dependent on the demands of its downstream 
customer and supplies of its upstream supplier. Moreover, considering trust in 
customer and trust in supplier can provide more information on their intention and 
allow us to examine possible linkages of trust perception, inventory decision, and 
extended inventory (Dietz and Den Hartog 2006; Smith and Barclay 1997). 
 
2.2. The effect of trust on inventory replenishment decision 
In a decentralized supply chain, inventory managers make inventory replenishment 
decisions with local information. Local information means each inventory manager is 
provided with the following information; received orders from downstream customer, 
on-hand inventory, placed orders to upstream supplier, shipments of upstream 
supplier, and shipments to downstream customer. The inventory manager does not 
know the orders from the downstream customer. Thus, the inventory manager faces 
demand uncertainty from downstream customer that may result in forecasting errors 
(Chen et al. 2000).   
 Croson and Donohue (2003, 2006) hypothesize that demand amplification might 
be due to demand signal processing. They use stationary demand in their studies. 
However, retailer knows the customer demand and other echelons have no 
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information about the realization of demand. To control that, Croson et al. (2012) 
keep the market demand stationary and known to all echelons. By this design, they 
remove all operational causes for demand uncertainty (Lee et al. 1997). Thus, 
decisions of the inventory managers in a chain remain the single source of uncertainty. 
They conclude that inventory managers have limited trust in their downstream 
customer orders. Hence, theory suggests: 
   
 HYPOTHESIS 1. A higher trust in customer leads to lower order quantity and 
shorter order time intervals.  
    
 In a decentralized supply chain, the inventory manager also does not know 
her/his upstream supplier’s on-hand inventory level, and the time s/he receives the 
upstream supplier shipments. Moreover, there is no communication among the 
managers. Therefore, the inventory manager may face supply uncertainty.  
 The inventory manager must consider that the time required for the upstream 
supplier to receive and to ship orders is at least as large as the shipment lead-time. 
Therefore, s/he must regulate her/his inventory with respect to the shipment lead-time. 
Nevertheless, evidence shows that inventory managers typically underweight the 
supply line (Sterman 1989) and expect shorter shipment lead-time from suppliers 
(Christopher 2005); this consequently leads to instability in the supply chain. 
 According to the trust definition in Section 2.1, trust in supplier is the inventory 
manager’s perception that the upstream supplier acts in a way to satisfy her/his needs. 
Given that trust is a psychological state of mind that can lead to a decision or a 
behavior (Rousseau et al. 1998), we expect trust in one’s upstream supplier to 
influence the inventory manager’s replenishment decision: 
   
 HYPOTHESIS 2. A higher trust in supplier leads to lower order quantity and 
shorter order time intervals. 
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2.3. The effect of trust on extended inventory 
Numerous studies propose that shipment delay and supply uncertainty reduce 
customer purchases (Heim and Sinha 2001; Anderson et al. 2006) or lead customers 
to switch their supplier (Fitzsimons 2000). Graves (1999) demonstrates that in a 
multi-echelon supply chain, the needs for inventory to buffer stochastic demand is 
greater than the stationary demand. Baganha and Cohen (1998) highlight the 
stabilizing role of inventory to absorb demand uncertainty. Thus, inventory is 
influenced by shipment delays, demand uncertainty, and inventory costs (Lieberman 
et al. 1999; Zipkin 2000). 
 In a serial supply chain, however, the inventory manager cannot cancel 
downstream customer orders, or abandon placing orders to her/his upstream supplier 
and/or shift the supplier. Demand and supply uncertainty in this supply chain context 
can increase the likelihood of backlog (Fisher 1997). To mitigate this risk, the 
inventory manager must hold inventory (Able 1985; Kahn 1987).  
 Given that, the inventory manager perceives the situation, builds perception about 
the downstream customer and upstream supplier (Chen et al. 2010; Tomlin 2009; 
Scarf 1959; Wecker 1978), and then s/he may decide and/or act (Ajzen 2002; 
Rokeach 1960; Smith et al. 1956). Consequently, we expect a link between an 
inventory manager’s trust levels and her/his extended inventory.  
 
 HYPOTHESIS 3. A higher trust in customer leads to lower inventory levels.  
 
 HYPOTHESIS 4. A higher trust in supplier leads to lower inventory levels. 
 
3. Research method 
3.1. Experimental setting 
We conduct the experiment within the context of “XBeer Game”. The “XBeer Game” 
is a role-playing simulation of a production and distribution system developed at 
Laval University (Montreuil et al. 2008). The experimental environment is selected 
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for two main reasons. First, it is a stable and controlled environment. Thus, it allows 
us to control extraneous variables (Katok 2011) and to avoid undesirable effects such 
as coalition and power. Second, it provides continuous data storage that assures the 
availability of a reliable data set for later analysis. 
The participatory simulation platform mimics the dynamics of a serial 
decentralized supply chain under continuous inventory review. The inventory 
managers decide how much to order for and when such an order should be placed? 
These decisions are made based on the available information to regulate inventory 
levels, to minimize total costs, and to satisfy downstream customer demand.  
 Figure 2 represents the structure of the supply chain in the experiment. A 
different subject manages each echelon. The market demand is stable and unknown to 
the subjects. The demand follows a normal distribution with a mean of 3000 units/day 
and a standard deviation of 500 units/day, truncated at zero. It is randomly split into 
two orders/day. The market demand arises at retailer; retailer fills customer orders out 
of on-hand inventory and places orders to wholesaler if necessary. Wholesaler, 
likewise, delivers required materials to retailer out of on-hand inventory and 
replenishes her/his inventory from distributor. Distributor delivers the orders to 
wholesaler, place orders and receives them from the factory. Factory is the producer 
who launches orders in production. Therefore, it exhibits a structural difference with 
respect to all other downstream levels. This structural difference is the main reason 
that factory role is played by computer agent. The subjects in distributor, wholesaler, 
and retailer roles are not aware of the fact that the most upstream supplier, factory, is 
simulated by a computer.  
 Each subject has access to the received orders from downstream customer, on-
hand inventory, placed orders to the upstream supplier, the shipments of upstream 
supplier, and the shipments to downstream customer. 
 There are two types of lead-times for the roles played by the subjects; an 
ordering lead-time of 1 day between order placement by a customer and order receive 
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by the supplier and shipment lead-time of 2 days between order shipment by a 
supplier and order delivery to the customer. When the customer order exceeds the on-
hand inventory the excess is backlogged.  
 The cost components that a subject incurs over the experiment are backorder 
cost, inventory holding cost, and purchasing cost. The incomes are sales to 
downstream customer and backlog fees from the upstream supplier. Incomes minus 
costs constitute the subject’s profit. Detailed set-up information is available in 
Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Structure of the supply chain. 
 
3.2. Experiment protocol  
The experiment proceeds as follows: Subjects enter the laboratory at an appointed 
time and are randomly assigned to their team and their role. We take four steps before 
starting the experiment to assure the subjects understand the experiment. First, each 
subject is provided with a handout (4-5 pages) explaining the experimental procedure 
and presenting the game interface. Second, after reading the instructions, subjects’ 
questions are answered, and the interface is presented. Third, subjects are asked to 
participate in two initial rounds of the experiment as a warm-up exercise. These three 
steps should have allowed a relatively stable understanding of the experiment. As the 
last step and to make sure the subjects understand the experiment, we ask them to 
answer a short quiz after warm-up session. The evaluation of their answers convinces 
Market Retailer Distributor Factory Wholesaler 
Demand  
N (3000, 500) 
Order 
Shipment 
 Roles played by computer agent 
Roles played by the subjects  
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us to run the experiment.  
 In design of the experiment, we tried to make the timing of data collection 
appropriate. The experiment is divided into eight rounds of approximately seven 
minutes. We disentangle trust in supplier and trust in customer and measure them 
through questionnaires. Data on trust are collected at the beginning of each round. 
More specifically, the experiment is stopped at the beginning of each round and 
subjects are asked to fill out form A, the inventory manager trust in her/ his supplier, 
and form B, the inventory trust in her/ his customer (for more details about trust 
construct and trust measurement, see Kaboli at al. 2013 b). 
 To reduce the risk of response bias, the order of questions in both questionnaires 
is changed at each round. To avoid any phony behavior and to remove the potential 
for inflated statistical relationships, the duration of the experiment is not announced in 
advance. Hence, we gather data on the first 8 rounds of the experiment and data from 
the rest of the experiment is not considered in the data analysis. At the end of the 
experiment, subjects are asked to fill a post-experiment questionnaire to explain their 
replenishment decision strategy (-ies) and finally they are paid based on the attained 
performance.  
 
3.3. Variables 
Table 1 summarizes the variables and the symbols. 
  Trust. Trust is measured using a procedure of previous work (see Appendix B). 
The subjects respond to 4 items using a seven-point Likert-scale ranging from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). The mean of the 4 items is used as the 
measurement of trust; either trust in customer (Tc) or trust in supplier (Ts). Thus the 
experiment results in 16 trust measurements for each subject; eight for trust in 
supplier and eight for trust in customer. An exploratory factor analysis with varimax 
rotation on the four items indicated that all items loaded onto a single factor that 
accounted for 60% to 75% of the variance. Items loaded on the factor at values 
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above .30 for trust in supplier and trust in customer. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for 
the trust in supplier and trust in customer ranges from .77 to .90 (Kaboli et al. 2013b). 
 Inventory replenishment decision (IR). In this study, we consider a continuous 
review system. This fact denotes that both order quantity and order time intervals are 
variable. To assess placed order quantity (OQ), we consider the indicated units of beer 
for each order sent to the immediate upstream supplier. The duration between two 
consecutive placed orders to the immediate upstream supplier is defined as placed 
order time intervals (OT).  
 Extended inventory (EI). To assess inventory managers buffering behavior, the 
following elements are used: on-hand inventory (OI), as the amount of beers available 
in stock for immediate shipment to customer and supply line (SL), as the amount of 
beers that have been ordered to the upstream supplier but not yet received. Therefore, 
EI is the sum of OI and SL at each round. 
     
Table 1: Summary of the variables and symbols 
 
 
 Data on trust are collected at the beginning of each round, as mentioned earlier 
in section 3.2, and data on the inventory replenishment decision and extended 
inventory are gathered continuously over the experiment through the participatory 
simulation platform. Thus, the timing of data gathering provides the ability to draw 
conclusions of causality between trust, inventory replenishment decision-making, and 
Variable  Symbol 
Trust  
Trust in customer  Tc 
Trust in supplier  Ts 
  
Inventory replenishment decision IR 
Placed order quantity OQ 
Placed order time intervals OT 
  
Extended inventory EI 
On-hand inventory OI 
Supply line SL 
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inventory levels (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3: The process of measurement. 
3.4. Subjects 
 Forty-eight undergraduate and graduate students from two Swiss Universities 
EPFL and UNIL (engineering and business majors) participate in this experiment for 
payoff contingent on performance. The subjects consist of 39% women and 61% men, 
with 24% of students in their bachelor, 54% in their master, and 22% in their PhD. As 
shown in Equation (1), in addition to a fix payment of 10 CHF for showing up to the 
experiment, the subjects could earn, on the basis of their performance, up to 50 CHF. 
Therefore, the subject goal is to maximize her/his earning. 
Earning = min {Show-up fee (10 CHF) + 40 CHF * ( !"#$!!"#$%&!"#$%&#!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$!!"#$%&), 50 CHF}
 (1) 
 
4. Statistical analysis 
In this study, several measurements are made on the same subjects over time. This 
fact induces inter-correlations among the observations corresponding to the same 
subject. Also, further exploration of the distribution of dependent variables; inventory 
replenishment decision (order quantity, order time intervals) and extended inventory 
suggests that they do not have a normal-like distribution. Therefore, we propose the 
use of Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) to assess the validity of the main 
hypotheses. GLMMs extend Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) by incorporating 
common random effects for observations corresponding to the same individual in the 
linear predictors, using Gamma family distributions for non-normal response 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 8 
End Rest of experiment Start 
Tc1, Ts1 Tc2, Ts2 Tc3, Ts3 Tc8, Ts8 
IR1, EI1 IR2, EI2 IR8, EI8 
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(dependent variable), and relating dependent variable with independent variables 
using link function (See Diggle et al. (2002) and Demidenko (2005) for further 
details).  
 The data set consists of 16 supply chains. The exploratory graphs propose the 
existence of outliers in four supply chains. Also further examination of the post-
experiment questionnaire shows that there is (at least) one subject in these four supply 
chains who may have misunderstood the experiment and the decision task. Therefore, 
in order to have a sample corresponding to a homogeneous target population we 
decided to exclude these four supply chains from the sample and we report on the 
results of 12 supply chains, 36 subjects, over 8 rounds, building 96 observations for 
each echelon or 288 total observations. Proposed analyses are conducted both at the 
individual and echelon levels.  
 
4.1. Model specification 
Since our exploration on the distributions of inventory replenishment decision (order 
quantity and order time intervals) and extended inventory shows that they have 
positive values that are right-skewed, we select a Gamma distribution with a 
logarithmic link function. Moreover, a random intercept is injected into the model for 
each subject to take the interdependence of observations, corresponding to the same 
subject, into account (Diggle et al. 2002, p.126). The adequacy of the fit is assessed 
for all fitted models using graphical tools. Statistical analyses are carried out using 
SAS 9.2. 
 To avoid multicoliniarity (Belsley et al. 2005, p.85; Gujarati 2003) and to 
disentangle subjects’ decisions on quantity and/or time intervals, we separate order 
quantity from customer’s order time intervals and consider them in two separate 
models. To test how inventory managers trust in customer affect the order quantity 
(OQ) and order time intervals (OT), we propose to construct the following models: 
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H1a : Log (OQij) = β0 + β1Tcij-1 + β2Tcij + β3 Rolei(R) + β4 Rolei(W) + β5 Rolei(D) (2) 
H1b: Log (OTij) = β0 + β1Tcij-1 + β2Tcij + β3 Rolei(R) + β4 Rolei(W) + β5 Rolei(D)  (3) 
where i denote the subject and j represents the round. Given that the subjects’ trust 
perception are history dependent (Kramer and Cook 2004) and trust is built over time 
through previous interactions and experiences (Boon and Holmes 1991; Gulati 1995; 
King-casas et al. 2005; Poppo et al. 2008), we consider “trust in customer” of 
previous round along with the “trust in customer” of the current round. Also, we take 
into account the effect of echelon differences (Kaboli et al. 2013a) on order quantity 
and order time intervals. Therefore, all three echelons; retailer (R), wholesaler (W), 
and distributor (D) are considered.  
 Following the same line of reasoning, to examine Hypothesis 2 we propose 
following models: 
H2a : Log (OQij) = β0 + β1Tsij-1 + β2Tsij + β3 Rolei(R) + β4 Rolei(W) + β5 Rolei(D)   (4) 
H2b: Log (OTij) = β0 + β1Tsij-1 + β2Tsij + β3 Rolei(R) + β4 Rolei(W) + β5 Rolei(D) (5) 
Moreover, we consider the following models for H3 and H4 respectively:  
H3: Log (EIij) = β0 + β1Tcij-1 + β2Tcij + β3 Rolei(R) + β4 Rolei(W) + β5 Rolei(D) (6) 
H4: Log (EIij)= β0 + β1Tsij-1 + β2Tsij + β3 Rolei(R) + β4 Rolei(W) + β5 Rolei(D)  (7) 
where EIij denote the extended inventory of the ith subject on jth round.  
 
5. Result and discussion 
5.1. Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables. The table is divided into four 
sections and provides the descriptive statistics for both individual (pooled), and 
echelon (retailer, wholesaler, distributor) levels. Results show that the mean and 
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median of trust in customer decrease from retailer to distributor. Concerning trust in 
supplier, the mean and median of wholesaler’s trust in supplier is the lowest. 
Distributor and retailer mean and median of trust in supplier are in the same level. 
The mean, median, and standard deviation of order quantity and order time intervals 
increase from retailer to distributor. Likewise, mean, median, and standard deviation 
of extended inventory tend to increase while moving upstream along the supply chain 
from retailer to distributor.     
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
  Mean Median SD Min Max 
Pooled (N=288)           
Trust in customer (Tc) 4.09 4.25 1.41 1 7 
Trust in supplier (Ts) 4.39 4.5 1.34 1 7 
Placed order quantity (OQ) 5571 4095 5601 1000 43000 
Placed order time intervals (OT) 46 34 47 5 432 
Extended inventory (EI) 14825 12148 9438 4990 73295 
      
Retailer (N=96)      
Trust in customer (Tc) 4.57 4.75 1.1 2.25 7 
Trust in supplier (Ts) 4.46 4.75 1.34 2 7 
Placed order quantity (OQ) 3797 2661 4931 1000 40000 
Placed order time intervals (OT) 26 22 20 5 120 
Extended inventory (EI) 12069 10541 5393 6152 41977 
      
Wholesaler (N=96)      
Trust in customer (Tc) 4.01 4 1.63 1 6.75 
Trust in supplier (Ts) 4.06 4.13 1.42 1 7 
Placed order quantity (OQ) 5892 4755 5097 1483 43000 
Placed order time intervals (OT) 52 36 53 12 432 
Extended inventory (EI) 15563 12614 10387 5071 69229 
      
Distributor (N=96)      
Trust in customer (Tc) 3.69 3.75 1.32 1 6.5 
Trust in supplier (Ts) 4.64 4.75 1.19 1 7 
Placed order quantity (OQ) 7088 5586 6270 1000 39000 
Placed order time intervals (OT) 60 47 54 5 304 
Extended inventory (EI) 16843 13710 10944 4990 73295 
 
5.2. The effect of trust in customer on inventory replenishment decision (H1) 
Recall we consider inventory replenishment decision in a continuous review 
environment. This denotes that both order quantity and order time intervals are 
variable. Table 3 represents the results of Hypothesis 1 for the effect of trust in 
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customer on order quantity (H1a, Equation 2) and order time intervals (H1b, Equation 
3).  
 Results in Table 3 show that trust in customer has a negative effect on the 
inventory manager’s order quantity at the individual level. At the echelon level, 
results show that only distributor’s trust in customer at the current round has a 
negative effect on order quantity and there is a no significant effect of trust in 
customer on wholesaler’s and retailer’s order quantity.  
 
Table 3: GLMM regression of trust in customer on inventory replenishment decision (H1) 
!! Pooled !! Distributor !! Wholesaler !! Retailer 
Coefficient Estimate (SE)   Estimate (SE)   Estimate (SE)   Estimate (SE) 
H1a: Tc!→ OQ               
Intercept 9.139*** (.236)  9.232*** (.284)  8.953*** (.306)  8.379*** (.402) 
Trust at round j-1 -.066** (.031)  -.048 (.054)  -.055 (.054)  -.086 (.055) 
Trust at round j -.072** (.032) ! -.116** (.055) ! -.050 (.059) ! -.015 (.055) 
Retailer -.585** (.269) ! ! ! ! ! !
Wholesaler -.056 (.268) ! ! ! ! ! !
Distributor † ! ! ! ! ! !
N  248   80   84   84 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
H1b: Tc →!OT ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Intercept 4.354*** (.246) ! 4.367*** (.331) ! 4.375*** (.390) ! 3.384*** (.361) 
Trust at round j-1 -.109*** (.039) ! -.178** (.069) ! -.054 (.075) ! -.052 (.051) 
Trust at round j -.011 (.040) ! .053 (.071) ! -.091 (.080) ! -.021 (.051) 
Retailer -.747*** (.257) ! ! !  ! !
Wholesaler -.084 (.255) ! ! ! ! ! !
Distributor † ! ! ! ! ! !
N  248 !!  80 !!  84 !!  84 
Note. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at p <.1,  ** significant at p <.05, and *** 
significant at p <.01. † is considered as reference category.   
 
 Furthermore, results of H1b show that trust in customer has a negative effect on 
order time intervals at the individual level in the previous round. Analysis at the 
echelon level reveals that trust in customer at the previous round has a negative effect 
on distributor’s order time intervals and there is a no significant effect of trust in 
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customer on wholesaler’s and retailer’s order time intervals.  
 The experimental results support Hypothesis 1 at the individual level as we find 
that low trust in customer is linked to high order quantity and the lengthen order time 
intervals at the individual levels. This outcome supports finding of Croson et al. 
(2012). However, at the echelon level, Hypothesis 1 is partially supported. This is in 
particular the case for distributor who exhibits the lowest trust in customer, highest 
order quantity and largest order time intervals among echelons. This finding shows 
that lower distributor’s trust in customer is associated with a significant increase of 
her/his order quantity and order time intervals. We believe this may be due to the 
higher demand uncertainty for the most upstream supplier. 
 
5.3. The effect of trust in supplier on inventory replenishment decision (H2) 
Table 4 represents the results of Hypothesis 2 for the effect of trust in supplier on 
order quantity (H2a, Equation 4) and order time intervals (H2b, Equation 5). Results in 
Table 4 for H2a show that there is no significant effect of trust in supplier on order 
quantity at the individual level. However, on the echelon level, analysis shows that 
retailer is the only echelon that considers trust in supplier while placing order 
quantities to upstream supplier. This could be explained by the fact that supply 
uncertainty is higher for the downstream customer than for the most upstream 
supplier (Tomiln 2009; Rong et al. 2008) and that suppliers shipment delays can 
increase order quantities (Dada et al. 2007; Silver 1976). 
 Furthermore, results for H2b show there is no significant effect of trust in supplier 
on the order time intervals at the individual level. At the echelon level, we only 
observe a positive association between wholesaler trust in supplier and order time 
intervals. Further inspections show that retailer coefficient of variation for order 
quantity and order time intervals are .43, .89, respectively, and wholesaler coefficient 
of variation for order quantity and order time intervals are .62, and .88, respectively 
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(see Figure 3 of chap. 2). Thus, one possible explanation is that wholesaler filters 
retailer variable order quantity and transforms them into variable order time intervals. 
In other words, retailer implements a replenishment procedure close to a variable 
quantity, fixed order time policy, while the wholesaler uses a replenishment practice 
close to a fixed quantity, variable time policy. This fact gives a demand signal of large 
order quantities with variable time intervals to the distributor. Thanks to the computer 
agent on factory role, distributor could build up higher inventory levels with less 
shipment delays. 
 
Table 4: GLMM regression of trust in supplier on inventory replenishment decision (H2) 
!! Pooled !! Distributor !! Wholesaler !! Retailer 
Coefficient Estimate (SE)   Estimate (SE)   Estimate (SE)   Estimate (SE) 
H2a: Ts →!OQ               
Intercept 8.796*** (.269)  8.788*** (.475)  8.160*** (.325)  8.265*** (.303) 
Trust at round j-1 -.028 (.029)  .022 (.068)  .042 (.056)  -.077** (.035) 
Trust at round j -.007 (.031) ! -. 053 (.078) ! .049 (.056) ! -.002 (.036) 
Retailer -.723*** (.277) !  ! ! ! !
Wholesaler -.126 (.278) ! ! ! ! ! !
Distributor † ! ! ! ! ! !
N  248   80   84   84 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
H2b: Ts →!OT ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Intercept 4.102*** (.282) ! 3.837*** (.540) ! 3.678*** (.401) ! 3.339*** (.265) 
Trust at round j-1 -.059 (.036) ! .029 (.083) ! -.107 (.073) ! -.043 (.032) 
Trust at round j -.018 (.037) ! -. 011 (.093) ! .135* (.074) ! -.021 (.033) 
Retailer -.868*** (.258) ! ! !  ! !
Wholesaler -.148 (.260) ! ! ! ! ! !
Distributor † ! ! ! ! ! !
N  248 !!  80 !!  84 !!  84 
Note. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at p <.1,  ** significant at p <.05, and *** 
significant at p <.01. † is considered as reference category.   
 
5.4. The effect of trust in customer on extended inventory (H3) 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that there is a negative relationship between trust in supplier 
and extended inventory. This means, inventory managers tend to buffer higher 
inventory levels (on-hand and supply line) when their trust in customer is low. 
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Experimental results in Table 5 fully support Hypothesis 3 for the individual and 
echelon levels. More precisely, results show that at the individual level trust in 
customer negatively affects inventory behavior in the current round. Moreover, at the 
echelon level, distributor and retailer trust in the current round are negatively 
associated with inventory behavior while for wholesaler this relationship holds at the 
previous round.  
 
Table 5: GLMM regression of trust in customer and trust in supplier on extended inventory 
(H3 and H4) 
!! Pooled !! Distributor !! Wholesaler !! Retailer 
Coefficient Estimate (SE)  Estimate (SE)  Estimate (SE)  Estimate (SE) 
H3: Tc →!EI               
Intercept 3.126*** (.150)  2.959*** (.237)  3.314*** (.230)  3.026*** (.256) 
Trust at round j-1 -.028 (.029)  .040 (.056)  -0.004 (.005)  -.051 (.043) 
Trust at round j -.074**  (.029) ! -0.005 (.376) ! -.077 (.048) ! -0.003 (.139) 
Retailer -.198 (.138) ! ! ! ! ! !
Wholesaler -.064 (.136) ! ! ! ! ! !
Distributor † ! ! ! ! ! !
N  252   84   84   84 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
H4: Ts →!EI ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Intercept 3.183*** (.183) ! †† ! 2.719*** (.281) ! 2.948*** (.173) 
Trust at round j-1 -.027 (.026) ! ! ! .062 (.048) ! -.023 (.028) 
Trust at round j -.066** (.027) ! ! ! -.079 (.050) ! -.085*** (.028) 
Retailer -.304** (.146) ! ! ! ! ! !
Wholesaler -.152 (.147) ! ! ! ! ! !
Distributor † ! ! ! ! ! !
N  252 !!  84 !!  84 !!  84 
Note. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at p <.1,  ** significant at p <.05, and *** 
significant at p <.01. † is considered as reference category.  †† represents the model is not converged. 
 
5.5. The effect of trust in supplier on extended inventory (H4) 
Table 5 also represents the results of Hypothesis 4 for the effect of trust in supplier on 
extended inventory (H4, Equation 7). Results show that Hypothesis 4 is supported at 
the individual level analysis. At the echelon level, the model did not converge for 
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distributor. However, retailer’s trust in supplier at the current round has a negative 
effect on her/his extended inventory. Thus our results show that inventory managers 
prefer to hold higher inventory level when they have lower trust in their upstream 
supplier.  
6. Conclusion 
The main objective of this study is to examine the effect of inventory managers’ trust 
perception on their inventory replenishment decision and extended inventory. We 
experimentally provide some supports that inventory managers’ trust has a cognitive 
basis that effects their replenishment decision and extended inventory at the 
individual and echelon levels (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Summary of the hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis Individual level Echelon level 
H1 
H1a Tc!→ OQ (-) Fully supported Partially supported 
H1b Tc!→ OT (-) Fully supported Partially supported 
H2 
H2a Ts!→ OQ (-) Not supported Partially supported 
H2b Ts!→ OT (-) Not supported Not supported 
H3 H3 Tc!→ EI (-) Fully supported Fully supported 
H4 H4 Ts!→ EI (-) Fully supported Partially supported 
 
 More precisely, we find that low trust in customer is linked to high order quantity 
and long order time intervals at the individual levels. Moreover, at the echelon level 
we find that distributor exhibits the lowest trust, highest order quantity and largest 
order time intervals among echelons. For the effect of trust in supplier on the order 
quantity and order time intervals, there is no support on the individual level. However, 
we find that when the retailer has lower trust in her/his supplier (wholesaler), s/he 
places larger order quantities. Findings of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 at the 
echelon level perfectly show how upstream supplier and downstream customer 
respectively react toward demand and supply uncertainty.  
 Moreover, we find that when inventory managers’ trust in customer is low, they 
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tend to hold higher inventory levels. This outcome supports finding of Baganha and 
Cohen (1998) on stabilizing effect of inventory in decentralized supply chain. Further, 
we find that inventory managers hold higher inventory level when they have lower 
trust in their upstream supplier. These findings provide more details to previous key 
influencers on extended inventory (Lieberman et al. 1999; Zipkin 2000), and propose 
that trust in customer and trust in supplier under demand and supply uncertainties lead 
inventory managers to hold higher inventory levels. 
 
6.1. Limitations and extensions  
There are several factors beyond the scope of our study that we leave for future 
studies. First, this study focuses on distributor-wholesaler-retailer triad. Future 
research should examine the robustness of our results in different supply chain 
contexts. Second, this study considers the effect of trust on inventory managers 
replenishment decision and extended inventory in a decentralized supply chain 
context. The level of trust in customer and trust in supplier is higher when there is 
communication between the subjects (Cummings and Bromiley, 1996). Also, 
information sharing has a positive effect on trust (Özer et al. 2011; Ebrahim-Khanjari 
et al. 2012). Thus, it would be interesting to extend this research to a centralized 
supply chain and compare the results. Third, we consider a conceptual model without 
feedback focusing on the inventory managers’ replenishment decision and extended 
inventory. Hence, future studies should examine a dynamic model considering 
feedback loops and corrections. Fourth, it should be noted that using student subjects 
does not necessarily limit our findings due to the simplicity of the decision task. 
However, there is some evidence that professional subjects perform better than 
student subjects (Croson 2007). Thus, it would be worthwhile to run a similar 
experiment for professionals, analyze, and compare data from both types of subject. 
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Appendix A: experiment detailed set-up information 
 
Table A1. Detail set-up information of the experiment 
  Factory Distributor Wholesaler Retailer 
On-hand inventory (unit) 9000 9000 9000 9000 
Holding cost ($/unit/day) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Backorder cost 
($/unit/day) 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Ordering fixed cost ($) 15 15 15 15 
Price of the beer ($) 4 6 8 10 
Benefit ($) 2 2 2 2 
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Appendix B: trust items 
 
Table B1. Selected items to operationalize trust 
#   Item wording Source 
1 Intention 
My supplier (customer) will not use opportunities 
that arise to take advantage at my expense 
 
Crosby et al. 1990, Kennedy 
et al. 2001 
2 Competence My supplier (customer) knows how to efficiently manage his/her company Boles et al. 1996 
3 Commitment My supplier (customer) is committed to on-time delivery (stable ordering behavior) 
Crosby et al. 1990, Zaheer 
and Venkatramon 1995, 
Cumming and Bromiley 
1996 
4 Reputation My supplier (customer) has reputation for on-time delivery (stable ordering behavior) 
Ganesan 1994, Plank et al. 
1999, Doney and Cannon 
1997 
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Chapter 5 !
 
Conclusion 
 
he main goal of this chapter is to review and to highlight the findings of this 
research. The following issues will be addressed in this chapter; thesis conclusion, 
contribution, research limitations, and recommendation for future research.  
  
T  
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Conclusion 
This study examines the impact of inventory managers’ trust on their inventory 
replenishment decision under continuous review in a decentralized supply chain. To 
cover this research goal, we conduct our study in an experimental environment. The 
main reasons for using a laboratory experiment are that it is a stable and controlled 
environment and that it provides repeatable and reliable observations. Specifically, it 
allows us to control the demand function, level of communication, information 
availability, and operational settings. Thus, we design an experimental setting where 
there are unknown market demands, no possibility for communication, and local 
information availability. We also set equal backorder and holding costs for each 
echelon to avoid possible noise, such as echelon’s power asymmetry, on examining 
trust. Moreover, to avoid framing effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), we link the 
subjects’ earing to their income and not the total costs.  
 The study has additional desirable feature. We study inventory replenishment 
decision under continuous review. This means both order quantity and order time 
intervals are variable for the inventory managers. Therefore, the inventory managers 
decide to regulate their inventory level based on quantity and/or time. Our analysis at 
the individual level shows that while moving upstream along the supply chain, the 
mean order quantity and the mean order time intervals tend to increase. Further 
analysis on the variability of order quantity and order time intervals along the supply 
chain reveals that the relative number of subjects with high variability of order 
quantity and order time intervals increases. On the echelon level also, we observe that 
the variability of order quantity increases while moving from retailer to distributor. 
However, our analysis shows that wholesaler plays a smoothing role in the middle of 
supply chain. More precisely, our study shows that wholesalers tend to implement 
fixed order quantity with variable time intervals policy. We consider echelon’s costs 
as well. Results suggest that the inventory managers’ replenishment decision has a 
significant influence on their own and the other echelons’ costs.  
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 We also consider the inventory managers’ trust level. We disentangle trust in 
supplier and trust in customer and measure them through questionnaires within the 
laboratory experiment context. Trust items are pooled, selected, and accordingly 
worded from previous research to build the trust construct regarding to the research 
design and context. We conduct pilot studies to purify our questionnaires. The choice 
of trust scale length is guided by two main considerations. The response biases and 
the subject fatigue over the experiment. Reverse-scored items are not used. The 
subjects are asked to evaluate the questionnaires based on a seven point Likert scale. 
To observe the evolution of trust in supplier and trust in customer on the inventory 
managers, data are collected over time. We implement Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) to 
check the sample adequacy and Barttlett test of sphericity to test the suitability of 
factor analysis. The factor analysis and an additional test, the scree test, suggest only 
one factor for each of trust in supplier and trust in customer. Moreover, the result of 
corrected item-total correlation and Cronbach’s alpha analysis assure the validity and 
reliability of the trust measurement. Our analysis shows that contrary to the normative 
studies that assume subjects are rational, self-interested, and do not trust if there is no 
way to communicate (Camerer, 2011), the inventory managers do trust in their 
supplier and customer in a decentralized supply chain. Also, further analysis of the 
results reveal that they have a tendency to trust in a range of no trust to high trust and 
not in a binary state of no-trust and high-trust. Furthermore, we observe that trust in 
customer decreases while moving upstream along the supply chain and trust in 
supplier is equal for retailer and distributor, while wholesaler has the least trust in 
supplier. We further assess the robustness of the findings with and without midpoint 
in Likert scale. Results for the both ways report the same findings. 
 These observations suggest further investigations to find the relationship 
between trust in customer, trust in supplier, and inventory replenishment decision. 
Our analysis at the echelon level shows that distributor has the lowest trust in 
customer, the highest order quantity, and the longest order time intervals. Moreover, 
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we observe trust in customer is linked to higher order quantity and longer order time 
intervals at the individual level. The echelon level analysis for the effect of trust in 
supplier reveals that lower trust in supplier causes higher order quantities for retailer. 
We also find that inventory managers hold higher inventory level when they have 
lower trust in customer and trust in their upstream supplier. Lower level of trust in 
customer lead inventory managers to hold higher inventory levels. These findings 
propose that trust in customer and trust in supplier under demand and supply 
uncertainties lead inventory managers to hold higher inventory levels. 
 It is important to highlight that the problem of trust in a decentralized supply chain 
is not only a matter of considerable theoretical interest; it is also one of the most 
practically attractive subjects. Sequential transactions that take place among unknown 
sellers and buyers on online auction platforms such as eBay (Ho and Weigelt, 2005), 
Amazon used books platform (Bolton et al., 2004; Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002), 
peer-to-peer content distribution platforms such as BitTorrent and Flicker (Backes et 
al., 2010), and online virtual world platforms such as second life (Zhu and Mutka, 
2005) are some of the real case examples. 
 This study focuses on the data analysis of the individual and echelon levels. 
This focus restricts the possible conclusions concerning the team trust level, supply 
chain ordering behavior, and its global performance. Therefore, one possible 
extension would be team level analysis.  
 The use of student subjects can be other limitation of this study. Although 
significant difference between student and professional subjects in supply chain has 
not been reported (Croson and Donohou, 2006; Holweg and Bicheno, 2002), the 
authors have experienced situations in which professional do tend to behave 
differently than students. Moreover, Croson (2007) reports some evidences from 
behavioral economics that professionals perform some subset of decision task better 
than students.  Thus investigating potential deviations between these two categories is 
still worth investigation.  
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 Future research in this area may examine the robustness of our results in 
different supply chain contexts. Different experimental settings such as known 
demand to remove demand signal processing from structural causes of order 
amplification could help understanding the behavioral factors under continuous 
review. Also, it increases the potential to draw conclusion on the fact that lack of trust 
is one of the behavioral causes of the bullwhip effect.  
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